CHAPTER XI

HARD EXPANSION

Fig. 95. Bombers swooped down before Schofield Barracks reviewing stand
As members of Congress looked on (September 3, 1935)

A GREAT NEW BASE

What years remained for Hawaii in the 1930s, aviation-wise, were devoted largely to increases militarily, as the United States paid greater attention to the buildup of military forces in Europe and the Pacific. Viewed with alarm was the multiplicity of armaments introduced into German, Italian and Japanese camps by their dictators, and the apparent imminence of war. The Army and Navy began to act.

In Hawaii, U.S. military aircraft expansion resulted in a need for more airfield space. In order for the Navy to accommodate its increases, the Army was forced to move off Ford Island. A large facility was needed not only for the Hawaiian Air Depot which became more useful with time, but for organizational expansion of other units. Wheeler would not do. During the period of 1917 to 1931, the Army’s air component in Hawaii consisted of seven tactical squadrons and two

Fig. 96. Taken from the Pearl Harbor side of Hickam Field, this 1936 aerial photo of the future Hickam Base shows Keehi Lagoon and Honolulu at the left, Damon Tract at top center, John Rodgers Airport at top right. Further to right is part of Ft. Kamehameha, and the white area at bottom right is Watertown. The ocean area to the right of the old John Rodgers Airport was filled in and is now the site of the Hawaiian Air National Guard. The road on the top left became Nimitz Highway.

service squadrons. In 1931 the 18^th Composite Wing was formed with headquarters at Ford Shafter in Honolulu. But now, more units were planned and would soon arrive.

Purchased from E. Faxon Bishop et al for $1,091,239, on February 20, 1935, were 2,200 acres of cane fields and algarroba between Pearl Harbor and Fort Kamehameha, adjacent also to the John Rodgers Airport. Under direction of the Army’s Quartermaster, America’s largest peace-time construction effort was implemented. Based there were to be a wing, (which at that time consisted of a headquarters squadron, four bomber squadrons, and a service squadron), totaling 57 bombers and four other aircraft, in addition to the Hawaiian Air Depot. Among new facilities was to be the famous “Hale Makai,” a 3,000-man barracks plus mess hall and various concessions. On May 31, 1935, the base was named for Lieutenant Colonel Horace M. Hickam, a promising air leader who died when his A-12 struck an obstruction on an unlighted runway at Fort Crockett, Texas. Construction continued for several years afterwards, but on September 1, 1937, the first detachment of 20 men (from the 31^st Bombardment Squadron) arrived on the new base and moved into tents.

March 9, 1938, saw a highly publicized entry into the Hawaiian Islands of a new type of bomber for the Army. Thirteen new B-18s were accepted by Major James G. Taylor, commanding the 31^st Bombardment Squadron, as Hickam facilities mushroomed. However, they had to be assembled at Ford Island.

On May 17, 1938, a Naval expansion act became law which authorized the President “to acquire or construct additional naval airplanes including patrol planes, and spare parts and equipment, so as to bring the number of useful naval airplanes to a total not less than 3,000 . . . “ The Pacific expected to get 428; Hawaii would receive a new base, on the windward side of Oahu, Kaneohe.

The Navy came through with an excellent aviation mark, on September 7, 1938, by making an impressive mass flight of 17 U.S. Navy planes from San Diego to Hawaii. They flew the 2,570 miles in 17 hours and 21 minutes.

That same month the Hawaiian Air Depot began its move from Luke. It was completed October 31, 1940. For administrative purposes on January 1, 1929, Luke was made a sub-base of Hickam until the official transfer on October 31.

Fig. 98. Early aerospace power is demonstrated in this formation of B-12 and B-18 bombers over Hickam Field. Hickam was officially activated on September 15, 1938, three months after this photo was taken.

Fig. 99. Hickam’s main entrance 1938.

Fig. 100. Marguerite Gambo, Honolulu aviatrix shown in cockpit of one of her planes from the Gambo Flying Service, 1939.

LOCAL AVIATRIX

Hawaii produced numerous aviatrixes in the 1930s, under instruction of Olen Andrew, Paul I. Gunn, Robert L. Tyce, Charles B. Knox, and Edward L. Peacock, in particular. The most notable was Marguerite Gambo (later Wood), who began to fly occasionally in 1932 with Peacock, and in 1937 was sent by Tyce on her first solo in a Kinner Fleet. Gunn provided the lady flyer with advanced training and soon she was rated a commercial pilot. In 1938 she participated in flying events, giving stunting exhibitions. By 1939, the aviatrix established Gambo Flying Service at John Rodgers Airport to meet demands by young men for flying training, a number of whom were primarily interested in interisland jobs and preparation for the eventuality of war. The Gambo hangar was the first privately built facility at the airport, adjacent to that of Inter-Island Airways. Flourishing rapidly in an aviation-minded community, the school produced aviators who later went on to distinguished duty in the armed forces. Gambo, Andrew, Knox and Tyce’s K-T Flyers were busy with private flying activities.

Fig. 101. Gambo airplanes at John Rodgers Airport, 1939.

NEW ACTIVITY

As the decade came more dramatically to an end, the face of Hawaii changed drastically. No longer was serenity the mode of living. Open talk about attack from the air appeared in newspapers and magazines. Appeasing speeches by local military leaders were made to the public, as the same time brandishing greater numbers of armaments and maneuvers. Instead of causing difficulty, it accelerated the acceptance of preparedness. The Islands became alive with military activity. Aircraft moved brightly about in their rightful place in the sky, atop and above the water, as well as on land, in preparation for any eventuality.

How useful the demi-god, Maui, could have been at that time. But there was no time for ancient fairy tales; planes from foreign lands might make the 1891 predictions of Carey a horrible and even worse reality; the coldly prophetic calculations of Billy Mitchell in the early 1920s were about to unfold, embarrassingly accurate.

The oft scoffed bird-craft had risen through the years in importance, to the point of threatening devastation of the lovely Hawaiian Islands. How right the pioneer advocates had been: Sweet, Curtiss, Mitchell.

The United States had devoted 20 years developing a capability to defend the Islands, but only lightly. The major national emphasis was on Axis-infested Europe. Consequently, reinforcement of hemisphere defenses on the Pacific side was lighter in magnitude and quantity. As diplomatic relations with Japan worsened, the Alaska-Hawaii-Panama triangle took on more of the proportions predicted by the airman Mitchell, and others. Serious attention was given to the key to Pacific defenses, the naval base at Pearl Harbor, and to the role of aircraft in Hawaii, America and the world. Aircraft’s effectiveness as a powerful tool of international diplomacy was dramatically expressed to the world during the Czechoslovakia crisis, the latter half of 1938, by Hitler and his Luftwaffe. There was much to be done in the United States and her possessions.

Fig. 102. P-26s on Wheeler Field’s Flight Line, 1930s.

On June 13, 1939, for the first time in the United States, troops, guns and equipment were successfully transported by air, by an infantry unit from Schofield Barracks. Arriving at Hickam in trucks completely equipped with packs, guns, food and supplies, 110 machine gunners of Company D, 19^th Infantry and 33 members of Major Taylor’s squadron moved by aircraft to quell an imaginary disturbance on Kauai. The trip took only 30 minutes. Thus aircraft had manifested yet another impressive capability in the Islands; future warfare took on an interesting new turn.

Not to be outdone by the military in aviation progress, Pan American Airways’ CALIFORNIA CLIPPER landed at Auckland, New Zealand, completing the first flight of a regular two-week service from San Francisco. This was in August, 1939, just a few days after a B-17A made an 1,200 mile flight from Miami to the Panama Canal Zone in six hours (showing the speed with which reinforcements could be rushed to protect the Canal).

In January, 1940, the 7^th Bombardment Group, Hamilton Field, surpassed Hawaii’s lead by moving a battalion of artillery 500 miles in 38 bombers, further developing the air mobility capability that showed great promise.

In March, 1940, General George C. Marshall became the first U.S. Army Chief of Staff to pay an official call on Oahu. He made the trip to evaluate Hawaii’s increasingly vital defense capabilities. Although Marshall later declared defenses generally adequate, he pressed for sharp increases in aircraft, anti-aircraft and personnel in Hawaii. Two months later, President Roosevelt demanded the numbers of aircraft for both the Army and Navy be increased to the all-high figure of 50,000, with 500 modern warplanes and 10,000 men to be placed in the islands.

Soon after, Hawaii was placed in a state of “limited emergency,” due to the political situation. The formerly peaceful tropical scene changed to one with uniformed men in tanks, armored cars, military vehicles and equipment rushing noisily through the streets of Honolulu,

Fig. 103. Formation of B-18s over Diamond Head, April, 1940.

purposely choosing the thickest of city traffic. Aircraft stormed through the skies on military missions. Sentries were set around important plants, buildings, other vital facilities. There was no question that Hawaii was preparing for defense. Local residents had become jittery. Prior to the Hawaiian Department’s maneuvers of April-May, 1940, a statement was issued to reassure the public. It sums up military activities at the time:

“Oahu will never be exposed to a blitz-krieg attack. This is why: we are more than 2,000 miles away from land whichever way you look, which is a long way for an enemy force to steam; and besides, it would have to smash through our Navy. But we plan for the worst possible situations, which means we assume that the Navy might be too busy elsewhere to help us. So we have developed a potent air defense. Our reconnaissance bombers are going farther and farther to sea. Our air bases here could be reinforced overnight from California bases. The potency of this striking power which would engage an enemy long before he sighted Oahu means that to land on Oahu the enemy must first win mastery of the air above it. Assuming that happened, enemy transports then would have to anchor offshore, making them fine targets for our coastal artillery. High speed, mobile forces can be rushed within an hour to any point on Oahu. They pack devastating power.”

“As international tensions increase in the Pacific, the war of nerves comes closer to Hawaii. So we double our vigilance, our intensive training. We don’t let up until the future is perfectly safe.”

Fig. 104. B-18s over Mauna Loa eruption, April, 1940.

Fig. 105. AAF in Hawaii F337. Flight line on Hickam Field. 1940

For the war problem, 56 Army planes took off to begin air operations. Almost every military plane on the Island later took part. Moreover, at landing fields bombers were dispersed so that in case of attack, an enemy bomb could not wreck more than one place at a time. Blackouts were enforced and, as in 1939, declared an unqualified success. But unlike that year when only Oahu was involved, this year’s maneuvers required a blackout in all the islands. One local organization feared that a description of the blackout broadcast to the mainland would influence vacation minded people’s desire to visit Hawaii.

By April 6, 1940, Hickam Field was the largest U.S. Air Corps station in the Pacific, with approximately 100 officers and 3,000 men. Expansion continued systematically. July saw Pan American Airways continue to expand over-water activity and capability. The ALASKAN CLIPPER, a Sikorsky S-42B, made the first flight from the United States to Alaska. On the same date, July 12, PAA delivered the first airmail to Auckland, New Zealand, by way of Honolulu, Canton Island and New Caledonia. (On September 11, PAA’s first passenger service along this route was made.)

On November 1, the Hawaiian Air Force (the first of its kind outside the continental limits of the United States) was activated under the command of Major General Fredrick L. Martin, with headquarters at Fort Shafter in Honolulu. Four days later, HAF had two base commands: 17^th Air Base and 18^th Bombardment Wing (B-10s) at Hickam, and 18^th Air Base at Wheeler with the 14^th Pursuit Wing consisting of P-26. The 86^th Observation Squadron was placed at Bellows Field, 28 road-miles from Hickam. Wheeler’s wing included one squadron in training at Haleiwa, a small field in the northern section of Oahu. To increase the range of the striking force, auxiliary fields were set up on the other islands with the active help of the Civil Aeronautics Authority. These included Kauai, Lanai, Hawaii, Maui and Molokai. To service these outlying fields, the First Transport Squadron was formed, consisting of eight airplanes. Continuing with rapid expansion, the Hawaiian Air Force’s aircraft strength rose to 117, in January, 1941, but all of them were obsolete or antiquated. One month later, 31 P-36s with pilots and crew chiefs left San Diego on the aircraft carrier ENTERPRISE bound for assignment in Hawaii. In April, 55 P-40s arrived, also by carrier. They were flown off the deck to Army airfields on Oahu.

The long-range bombers had been perfected and a decision to allocate B-17s to the Hawaiian Air Force followed. However, they would have to be mass-flown to the islands, a feat that had never been done before. In April, 1941, the Fourth Air Force prepared 21 aircraft and ferry crews for the journey, at the same time making arrangements for active assistance by the Navy, Pan American Airways, and commercial radio stations at San Francisco and Honolulu. The Navy was certainly experienced at placing guard-ships along an airplane’s watery route, something they’d done beginning with John Rodgers in 1925. Arrangements were firmed to provide such support for the B-17s. Ground-air liaison communication was also arranged by the Navy. Commercial airlines agreed to provide weather forecasts and map signals to the airborne bombers, while radio stations in San Francisco and Honolulu cooperated by promising homing signals in continuous broadcast during the flight.

The mid-Pacific springboard got ready and on May 13, 1941, the 21 B-17Ds left Hamilton Field, California, near historic Oakland, bound for the Hawaiian Islands in splendid formation. After 13 hours and 10 minutes, the pride of Boeing landed graciously at Hickam Field, only five minutes off their estimated time of arrival. There was no question in the minds of any beholder, either at Hamilton or Hickam, that the Untied States was concerned over the possibilities of war in the Pacific, nor that they had the fire–power to seek decisive victory. There was no need to justify the importance of the Hawaiian Islands to military aviation, and the vital need of warplanes for the mid-Pacific landing facility.

Joint defense plans called for the Army to defend the coast against attack, while the Navy was to seek out and repel enemy forces near the coast. Together, they were to repel attacks on coastal objectives. The Navy was charged with “a system of off-shore scouting and patrol to give timely warning of an attack and, in addition, to operate against enemy forces in the vicinity of the coast.” Long-range reconnaissance was the Navy’s job, warning and alert for defense was the Army’s role.

In July, 1941, the Hawaiian Air Force completed a study and drew up plans for use of bombardment aircraft in the Islands. The plan considered existing pursuit groups adequate for their task, if kept up to strength, and projected radar installation for enemy detection work. Called for was air reconnaissance of the Hawaiian area during daylight, and the provision of an on-call attack force to strike known targets and carriers with enemy planes before they were unleashed against the Islands. Seventy-two B-17s were specified to do the job. Proposed were daily search missions within the circle of an 833-nautical-mile radius of Oahu, each plane covering a five degree section. The plan had one drawback: the entire Air Corps possessed far fewer B-17s than that desired for Hawaii. The plan was scrapped but the conclusion was reached that detection and handling of enemy carriers would be by long-range strike aircraft.

Fig. 106. New B-18s lined up on Hickam’s apron prior to the Japanese attack in 1941.

Hickam’s construction progress was such that Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force was able to move from Fort Shafter to the new base. About that time the 19^th Bombardment Wing arrived from California en route to defend the Philippines, considered most likely for attack in the Pacific. A mass trans-Pacific flight of heavy bombers was begun by the 14^th Bombardment Squadron for the Philippines via Midway, Wake, Port Moresby, and Darwin. They landed at Clark Field, Manila, on September 12. On October 26 B-17s landed at Hickam for further dispatch.

The War Department’s decision to send reinforcements to the Philippines meant that Hawaii’s priority for aircraft to support their own mission was lowered considerably, with some of HAF’s aircraft inventory diverted to the Philippines. Then the Navy found it could not protect Midway and Wake for lack of sufficient aircraft, and asked for planes from the Army. On November 28, 1941, the War Department was informed that two pursuit squadrons, totaling 50 P-40s and 240 personnel were ready to leave for the two islands by carrier, the Marines to supply more aircraft later. However, because P-40s could not be landed on carriers, the Navy held up acceptance. Also on that day, the War Department alerted 12 B-17s from Hawaii for movement to the Philippines. Two days later, the 7^th Bombardment Group’s ground echelon of 2,500 men, 18 P-40s and 52 unassembled A-20s left Honolulu in a convoy to the Philippines, only to be diverted on December 12 to Australia. One of two B-24s equipped for high altitude photography

of Japanese-held Marshall Islands, on December 5, arrived in Hawaii. By December 7, the Hawaiian Air Force was an integrated command for slightly more than one year. It consisted of 754 officers, 6,706 enlisted men, 231 military planes, and six radar detector stations in operation.

From the civilian end, Inter-Island Airways, Inc. was active in improvements. The company decided to buy three DC-3s. But there was a problem convincing travelers that the new land planes, more comfortable and modern, were as safe as amphibians. Kennedy decided on a dramatic move. The three planes took off from Oakland one morning in August, 1941, and flew in formation to Honolulu in 14 hours and 58 minutes. It was, at that time, the longest over-water flight ever made by the DC-3. Thousands of people were at the airport when the planes came to Honolulu. The event was heralded in Hawaii’s press and the DC-3 won rapid acceptance as a safe and advanced transport. It was at this time that the company changed its name to Hawaiian Airlines. This was done primarily to secure a clear identification to potential mainland travelers and to clear the way for possible trans-Pacific operations.

A SINISTER FORCE

On November 26, 1941, a Japanese task force began to move out of Hitakappu Bay in the Kuriles and proceed intently towards its mid-Pacific destination and a bloody mark in history. The force consisted of six aircraft carriers, two battleships, two cruisers, nine destroyers and three submarines. Carefully selected pilots for the aircraft averaged 800 hours’ flying time each, and had undergone intensive training in horizontal bombing, dive bombing and torpedo attack in harbor waters.

On the following day the Hawaiian Islands were placed on alert, but not from knowing the force’s whereabouts or intentions. Word of diplomatic worsening between the United States and Japan was received, resulting in precautionary measures being taken throughout the Island group. Sabotage was feared from within. Aircraft were corralled into hangars or placed wing-tip to wing-tip for internal security, rather than dispersed for air attack. Extra guards were placed on duty around vulnerable targets. Protective fencing and floodlights were installed. Outright attack by enemy forces was expected, but in the Philippines rather than Hawaii.

At Hamilton Field, California, on December 6, General Henry H. Arnold told the crews of 13 B-17s who were about to leave for Hickam on the first leg of an aerial journey to the Philippines that they “might run into trouble somewhere along the line.” However, he had the Mandate Isles in the vicinity of Truk in mind. Then they took off.

The Japanese main force arrived at a position about 200 miles northwest of Oahu before daybreak on December 7, unobserved and poised for attack. Cruising about the water of Oahu were 28 large Japanese submarines, gathering intelligence and positioned to stop any escaping U.S. ships after the assault. Five of these carried midget submarines clamped on their afterdecks. The tiny craft held two men, torpedoes and were powered by batteries. Released from mother submarines, they began to prowl Pearl Harbor’s adjacent waters, about 10 miles out. At 3:30 a.m. they headed straight for the pride of the U.S. fleet.

Within Pearl Harbor strange commotions were taking place. Sighting one of the midget submarine’s periscopes close to the entrance to Pearl Harbor, at 3:43 a.m., alert minesweeper CONDOR signaled the destroyer WARD into action. A Kaneohe based PBY dropped position markers to assist Skipper Outerbridge of the WARD locate his underwater target. The ensuing search lasted almost two hours, but the sub was not located.

At 5:30 a.m., two seaplanes were catapulted into the air from separate Japanese ships to perform final reconnaissance of the Oahu target area. Then at precisely 0600 hours, the first wave was ordered into the air. It consisted of 50 fighters, 50 horizontal bombers, 40 torpedo bombers and 50 dive bombers, from their carriers. They made for Oahu.

At 6:45 a.m., U.S. target repair ship ANTARES brought the WARD to the right trail as she plowed for Honolulu Harbor. This time the destroyer fired her guns at the tiny submarine’s conning tower. The first three-inch shell missed, but the next scored a hit. Depth charges followed and Fourteenth Naval District Headquarters was notified of the event. Ensign William Tanner, pilot for the PBY back on the scene, released depth bombs too, and then reported the activity to his home base, Kaneohe Naval Air Station. Their effectiveness was without question as geysers of water and foam billowed from out of the sea, one mile from Pearl Harbor’s entrance. The Navy men, in the ships and airborne, were not sure what they had sunk, whether American or foreign. One thing was certain! Ship and aircraft collaborated in the sinking of the enemy, firing the first shots of many to be sounded around the world!