CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION
STATE OF HAWAII
WILLIAM D. HOSHIJO, ) Docket No. 97-001-PA-R
Executive Director, on )
behalf of the complaint ) FINAL DECISION AND ORDER
filed by ERIC WHITE, )
)
v. )
)
STATE OF HAWAII, UNIVERSITY )
OF HAWAII; and ROB WALLACE, )
)
Respondents. )
______________________________)
FINAL DECISION AND ORDER
The Hearings Examiner filed the Proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Recommended Decision on February 2, 1998.
The Executive Director and Respondents State of Hawaii, University
of Hawaii ("U.H."), and Rob Wallace ("Wallace") filed timely
Written Exceptions and requested oral argument. The Executive
Director also filed a timely Statement in Support.
The Commission heard oral argument on April 3, 1998. Present
were Commissioners Jack Law, Allicyn Hikida Tasaka, Faye Kennedy,
and Harry Yee. Cheryl Tipton, Esq., represented the Executive
Director; Russell Suzuki, Esq., represented U.H., and Jeffrey
Portnoy, Esq., represented Wallace.
Chairperson Claudio Suyat, who could not be present because
of illness, listened to the tape recording of the oral argument,
Affidavit of Claudio Suyat, filed on April 14, 1998, read the
submissions, considered the portions of the record cited by the
parties, H.R.S. 368-14(a), and will participate in the decision.
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS:
This case involves racial slurs made to a spectator by a U.H.
student manager during a basketball game at the U.H. Special
Events Arena. Neither U.H. or Wallace took exception to the
Proposed Findings of Fact that Wallace made racial slurs to
Complainant Eric White ("White").
White, an avid fan and member of the booster club, attended a
University of Hawaii vs. University of Utah basketball game on
February 18, 1995, with his wife and young child. Proposed
Findings of Fact ("Fact") 14 and 17. During the game, White, who
was sitting near the team, made many comments about the
coaching[1]. Fact 18. The arena manager, who heard the comments,
believed that although irritating, they were not offensive[2], so
he did not ask White to quiet down. Fact 19.
Wallace, a student manager of the team, is the son of U.H.
basketball coach, Riley Wallace. Fact 8. As part of his duties,
Wallace sat near the team, about eight feet from White, and heard
his comments. Fact 17. Wallace became irritated by the criticism
of the coaching and believed that the comments were attacks on his
father. Fact 19.
Near the end of the game, Wallace turned to White and said,
"Shut up you fucking nigger! I'm tired of hearing your shit!
Shut your mouth or I'll kick your ass!" Fact 20. White replied,
"Oh yeah, punk, come over and try it! You see me all the time,
what's the problem? Fact 22. Wallace moved within a few feet of
White and said, "Just shut up, nigger or I'll kick your ass!"
Fact 23. An assistant arena manager intervened to end the
encounter. Id.
After the game, White tried to file a complaint with U.H.
Fact 27. The arena manager would not accept his complaint and
told him to file a police complaint. Id. White tried to file
with the police department but was refused because the incident
was considered to be a civil matter. Facts 30 and 35.
Ultimately, White complained to the U.H. athletic director, and
Wallace was suspended as a result. Fact 40. Later, White filed a
timely administrative complaint with the Commission alleging
discrimination in public accommodations because of his race.
II. STATE PUBLIC POLICY AGAINST DISCRIMINATION:
The Hawai`i Constitution, Art. I, Sect. 5, provides: "No
person shall ... be denied the enjoyment of the person's civil
rights or be discriminated in the exercise there of because of
race, religion, sex, or ancestry." Racial discrimination in
public accommodations is against the public policy of the State.
H.R.S. 368-1. The Hawai'i Supreme Court has stated that the
State's "public policy against racial discrimination is beyond
question." Hyatt Corp. v. Honolulu Liquor Commission, 69 Haw.
238, 244, 738 P.2d 1205 (1987).
In construing the public accommodations law, H.R.S. Chapter
489, the Commission must carry out the mandate of H.R.S. 489-1:
(a) The purpose of this chapter is to protect the
interests, rights, and privileges of all persons
within the State with regard to access and use of
public accommodations by prohibiting unfair
discrimination.
(b) This chapter shall be liberally construed to
further the purposes stated in subsection (a).
In addition to the clear statutory mandate, the law is remedial
legislation which must be liberally construed, Flores v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 70 Haw. 1, 757 P.2d 641 (1988), in order to
protect "the general public as customers, clients or visitors of a
place of public accommodations." H.R.S. 489-2 (definition of
place of public accommodations).
III. EXCEPTIONS TO FACTUAL FINDINGS:
U.H. takes exception to Facts 16 and 37. U.H. contends that
Fact 16 is clearly erroneous because the Hearings Examiner should
have found that White cursed, swore, and used profanity in his
comments about the coaching. The record reflects, however, that
both Wallace, Tr. at 83, and the arena manager, who heard the
comments, Exh. 21. at 11, testified that White did not use
profanity. Other nearby witnesses testified that White did not
use profanities prior to the incident with Wallace. Tr. at 303-
04, 365. Based upon the record, the Commission adopts Fact 16
because it correctly describes White's comments before the
incident. U.H. contends that Fact 37 which states that
Wallace was not disciplined as of February 19, 1995, suggests that
he was favored over an African American player, who had previously
been disciplined for swearing. U.H. claims that it would be
inconsistent with due process for it to take disciplinary action
against Wallace by that date. Based on the record, the Commission
determines that the finding is correct because it recounts what
happened on that date, regardless of any suggestion of favoritism,
and adopts Fact 37.
The Executive Director takes exception to Facts 41 and 42,
which state that Wallace was terminated from his position as
student manager. The Executive Director contends that Wallace was
merely suspended from his duties and continued to receive a
monthly payment under his athletic scholarship. U.H. notes that
Wallace was suspended. U.H. Exceptions at 11. Based on the
record and U.H.'s position on the matter, the Commission modifies
Facts 41 and 42 to state that Wallace was suspended, not
terminated.
The Commission finds that the record supports the entirety of
the Proposed Findings of Fact, with the modification regarding
Wallace's suspension, and incorporates them in the Final Decision.
IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
1. JURISDICTION OVER U.H.
The Hearings Examiner concluded that U.H. as the owner and
operator of the Special Events Arena, is a place of public
accommodations and is subject to the provisions of H.R.S. Chapter
489. U.H. takes exception and argues: 1) that it has sovereign
immunity and cannot be sued for monetary damages for civil rights or
constitutional violations under Figueroa v. State, 61 Haw. 369, 604
P.2d 1198 (1979); and 2) that under the State Tort Liability Act
("STLA"), H.R.S. Chapter 662, if applicable, the State has immunity
for intentional torts, such as occurred here, and the Commission
cannot decide the case because circuit courts have original
jurisdiction under the STLA.
The Executive Director argues: 1) that Figueroa and the other
cases cited for immunity deal with monetary damages for violations
of the State Constitution and are not applicable where State law
violations are claimed; and 2) under H.R.S. 661-1(1), the State has
agreed to be sued for claims "founded upon any statute of the
State[,]" and that because the claim arises under H.R.S. Chapters
368 and 489, the State has waived its sovereign immunity for
violations of the public accommodations law.
The Commission believes that the statutory scheme supports a
conclusion that U.H. is liable for monetary damages under H.R.S.
Chapter 489. "Place of public accommodation" is defined to include:
"sports arena, stadium, or other place of exhibition or
entertainment." H.R.S. 489-2. The Executive Director argues that
coverage of the State was envisioned by the Legislature because
government rather than the private sector normally operates such
facilities. Supportive of coverage is the definition of "person" in
H.R.S. 489-2 which includes "the State, or any governmental entity
or agency[,]" and H.R.S. 489-8, which provides, in part: "It shall
be unlawful for a person to discriminate unfairly in public
accommodations." Emphasis added. When read in para materia, it is
clear that the law envisions coverage of places of public
accommodations operated by the State. Thus, the Commission adopts
Conclusion of Law A,1, that U.H. as the owner and operator of the
Special Events Arena is subject to H.R.S. Chapter 489 [3] for the
acts of its employees or agents under the doctrine of respondeat
superior.
2. Wallace's Status as Employee or Agent:
The Hearings Examiner concluded that "[p]ursuant to H.R.S.
498-3, this Commission has jurisdiction over Respondent Wallace only
if he is an owner, operator, employee or agent of a [place] of
public accommodations[,]" and that Wallace was an agent of U.H. but
not an employee. In so concluding, the Hearings Examiner relied
upon a Commission declaratory ruling, In re Santiago/Iolani Swim
Club, DR No. 92-007 (March 5, 1993). In that case, the Commission
adopted the economic realities test to determine if an individual is
an employee, covered by the employment discrimination law, H.R.S.
Chapter 378, part I, rather than an independent contractor. The
test requires a case by case consideration of numerous factors
relevant to employment status, with no single factor being
controlling, in order to best reveal the work relationship.
Under H.R.S. 489-8, it is unlawful for "a person" to engage
in unfair discrimination. This suggests that the distinction
between employee and independent contractor status is not as
critical under the public accommodations law. So the factors in the
economic realities test indicating that an individual is more akin
to an independent contractor than an employee need not be given as
much weight. This view is consistent with the liberal construction
requirement, H.R.S. 489-1(b), and case law indicating that
employee status for the purposes of social legislation should be
construed "in light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to
be obtained." Bailey's Bakery v. Tax Commissioner, 38 Haw. 16, 27-
28 (1948).
Wallace was one of two student managers of the basketball team.
The duties of a student manager are contained in a U.H. job
description, Exh. 28, which lists an extensive range of services
that must be performed by a student manager prior to, during, and
after the season, including, sweeping floors before practice,
issuing and keeping track of equipment, working with players on
drills, cleaning the locker rooms, setting up the locker rooms and
equipment on game days, working on the bench during games, packing
travel bags and going on road trips, working with visiting teams
(gym set up, practice, and laundry), working with the equipment room
manager, and monitoring post season weight training. In return for
these services, a student manager receives an athletic scholarship
consisting of a tuition waiver, book loans, and money for housing
and meals ($580.00 per month). However, U.H. considers a student
manager to be a student athlete rather than an employee, despite the
obvious differences between the services provided by a student
manager and the athletic performance of a student athlete.
Wallace argues that a student athlete should not be considered
an employee of the university and cites several cases for this
proposition. However, the cited cases deal with whether a student
athlete, not a student manager, is considered an employee or agent
for the purposes of coverage under workers' compensation statutes[4]
or tort law. Thus, they have no relevance for deciding whether a
student manager is an employee under the public accommodations law.
Although U.H. had significant control over the means and manner
of Wallace's performance of his duties and made monthly payments for
room and board and waived tuition costs, the Hearings Examiner gave
greater weight to how U.H. classified and disciplined student
managers; how it compensated them; and how the parties viewed their
relationship. Of significance were: 1) the "Athletic Agreement",
which did not mention creation of an employment relationship or
payment of salary or wages; 2) the fact that student managers did
not receive annual leave, workers' compensation, or medical
benefits, as did other employees; 3) the fact that they were subject
to disciplinary policies under the Student-Athlete Handbook, not the
employee personnel manual; 4) U.H.'s failure to assign an employee
number or withhold taxes; and 5) the view of both U.H. and Wallace
that he was a student athlete, not an employee.
The Commission does not give the Athletic Agreement great
weight for determining Wallace's employment status because of the
transitory nature of a student's work relationship and U.H.'s
control in creating the agreement. Higher education prepares a
student for future employment. Working at a university helps to pay
for a student's education and is not intended to be a career path.
For most students, it is unimportant whether one is called an
"employee" as long as payment is received for services rendered.
The Athletic Agreement allows U.H. to create a special relationship
with selected students, who are paid to provide services to or play
for its athletic teams, call them something other than an employee,
and designate their reimbursement as something other than wages or
salary. But the labels used by U.H. should not control the
analysis. See, Locations, Inc. v. Hawai`i Dept. of Labor and
Industrial Relations, 79 Hawai`i 208, 211, 900 P.2d 784 (1995)
("employment relationship may exist even in situations where parties
have 'agreed' not to label themselves as employer and employee.")
Under the public accommodations law, it is not significant that
the Athletic Agreement classified Wallace as a student athlete,
rather than an employee, or gave him an athletic scholarship
(consisting primarily of money and other financial considerations)
for his services, rather than wages or salary. Nor is it
significant that U.H. did not provide certain fringe benefits
(annual leave, workers' compensation, or medical care), assign an
employee number, or withhold taxes as it would for its employees.
The non-existence of such factors, while helpful in discerning
independent contractor status under the employment law, need not be
given as much weight under the public accommodations law. For
similar reasons, it is not significant that a student manager is
subject to discipline under the Student-Athlete Handbook rather than
an employee personnel manual or the parties' agreement that Wallace
was not an employee. Locations Inc., supra.
"An 'employee' is commonly and ordinarily defined as 'one who
works for a salary or wages under directions.'" Lai v. St. Peter,
10 Haw. App. 298, 304 (1994) (citation omitted). Under the job
description, Exh. 28, a student manager provides a wide range of
services to the basketball team at the direction of the coaching
staff and receives financial payments. A student manager does not
perform as an athlete. U.H. could pay an employee to perform a
student manager's duties but could not do the same with a student
athlete. This difference highlights the Commission's belief that
Wallace should be considered an employee of U.H. for the purposes of
the public accommodations law. When he made the racial slurs, which
denied White the full and equal enjoyment of the basketball game,
Wallace was providing services to U.H. and being paid. He was not
at the arena as a member of the general public or the coach's son.
Thus, the Commission concludes that under Chapter 489, Wallace was
an employee of U.H. acting within the scope of this employment and
reverses Conclusion of Law A,2,a.
In the alternative, the Commission concludes that Wallace, if
he was not an employee, was an agent of U.H. The Hearings Examiner
concluded that Wallace was an agent because U.H. had delegated to
him, as a student athlete and member of the basketball team, the
authority to provide entertainment to and interact with the public
on its behalf at basketball practices, games, and fund-raisers.
Wallace contends that there was no agency relation created
because there was no meeting of minds between him and U.H. that he
was to act on U.H.'s behalf with regard to spectators, and the
normal usage of the term "student manager" does not connote any
authority to deal with spectators. U.H. contends that there was no
agency relationship because the facts do not establish that Wallace
was authorized to deal with the public at basketball games or use
racial slurs. U.H. notes that other employees were responsible for
dealing with spectators and that student athletes are prohibited
from making racial slurs.
Respondents' arguments overly constrict the scope of a student
manager's authority to act on behalf of U.H. A student manager's
job description envisions providing a wide range of services to
assist the basketball team. A student manager is specifically
required to "[w]ork on the bench during the game." Exh. 28. Thus,
at a minimum, there was a meeting of the minds that Wallace was
authorized to do things to assist the basketball team during games.
Whether acting to quiet down a loud spectator during the game would
fall within such authority is the question. Put another way, if,
during a timeout with ten seconds left in a tie game, a spectator's
loud voice makes it difficult for the team to hear a coach's
instructions, would it be within a student manager's scope of
authority to try to quiet the spectator down?
The Commission believes that a student manager trying to quiet
down a loud spectator would be acting within the scope of his
authority to do things to assist the team if done in a non-racist,
non-threatening manner. However, the problem in this case is the
manner in which Wallace carried out his authority. The record
indicates that Wallace viewed White's comments as being critical of
the coaching staff and his father, in particular. Fact 19. He
wanted to stop those comments because he told White several times to
"shut up." That he used expletives, racial epithets[5], and
threatened White with immediate bodily harm is the problem.
However, Wallace's actions do not fall outside the scope of his
authority simply because of the language he used. It would be
inconsistent with the liberal construction requirement of H.R.S.
489-1(b) to find that an agent's actions go beyond the scope of his
or her authority because of the offensiveness of the manner in which
the actions were carried out. Thus, the Commission adopts
Conclusion of Law A,2,b, that Wallace was an agent of U.H. and
subject to H.R.S. Chapter 489 for the reasons expressed in the
Recommended Decision and as expanded upon herein.
3. FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES:
Both U.H. and Wallace raise First Amendment free speech
concerns. They claim that under the First Amendment Wallace cannot
be punished for his statements because he was acting as the son of
the coach, not as an employee or agent of U.H. In other words,
Wallace was acting as a private individual when he made the racial
slurs. However, the Commission has concluded that Wallace was
acting as an employee or agent of U.H. when he made the racial
slurs, and the record does not support the claim that he was acting
as a private individual.
Racial slurs can be proscribed under the public accommodations
law. Consistent with the First Amendment, a State can regulate
conduct, i.e., racial discrimination in public accommodations, even
though there is an incidental limitation on speech, if the
regulation furthers important governmental interests; the interest
is unrelated to the suppression of speech; and the restriction on
expression is no greater than essential for furtherance of that
interest. O'Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20
L.Ed. 2d 672 (1968). In the instant case, H.R.S. Chapter 489
furthers the Hawai`i Constitution and the legislative public policy
declaration against discrimination by regulating race-based conduct
which interferes with "the interests, rights, and privileges of all
persons with the State with regard to access and use of public
accommodations", H.R.S. 489-1(a), is unrelated to the suppression
of speech, and furthers these interests with minimal impact upon
speech.
In addition to using racial epithets[6] and expletives, Wallace
threatened twice to "kick [White's] ass!" Facts 20 and 23. The
Commission believes that such threats, in conjunction with the
racial epithets and expletives, can be viewed as speech which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of peace. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 86
S.Ct. 1031 (1941). As such, Wallace's speech does not fall within
any First Amendment protection.
It is unfortunate that Wallace used such language. As the
coach's son, it is understandable that he would want to defend his
father. However, the words he used are inexcusable. In the heat of
the moment, he lost his self-control[7], and the record clearly
reflects that now he deeply regrets the incident. Fact 46. It is
unfortunate that the Commission must publicly decide this case where
it is clear that racial slurs were made to a spectator at a U.H.
sporting event by a person working for the university. Regardless
of whether Wallace was an agent or employee, U.H. must bear some
responsibility for what happened. This is not a case where a U.H.
student, with no other ties to the university, acts in a racially
offensive manner to a spectator at a sporting event in a U.H.
facility.
4. LIABILITY AND REMEDIES
In this case, the public accommodations law is designed to
protect a member of the general public from being denied the full
and equal enjoyment of watching a basketball game at the Special
Events Arena because of his or her race. H.R.S. 489-3. It is
clear that Wallace's racial slurs denied White the full and equal
enjoyment of watching the game. The Commission upholds Conclusion
of Law B that the public accommodations law prohibits single
isolated instances of discriminatory conduct, Re Smith/MTL et al.,
Docket No. 92-003-PA-R-S (November 9, 1993), and that the Executive
Director has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Wallace's
actions violated H.R.S. 498-3.
The Commission upholds Conclusion of Law C,1, that U.H. is
liable for Wallace's actions under the doctrine of respondeat
superior. The Commission upholds Conclusion of Law C,2, that
Wallace is personally liable as an agent for his discriminatory
practices and modifies it to add that he is also personally liable
as an employee.
The Commission upholds Conclusion of Law D,1, to the extent
that it finds Wallace and U.H. to be jointly and severally liable
for $10,000.00 in compensatory damages for the racial slurs for the
reasons in the Recommended Decision. The Commission modifies
Conclusion of Law D,1, regarding the compensatory damages against
U.H. for not taking immediate, appropriate, corrective action after
Wallace's racial slur and increases the amount from $10,000.00 to
$20,000.00.
As outlined in Facts 27-43, the record shows that U.H. staff
treated White rudely when he complained and did not follow normal
procedures for dealing with complaints. The arena manager's
reaction to the incident insinuated that White was at fault,
questioned whether the word "nigger" was used, and declined any
responsibility for dealing with the matter. Fact 27. No written
complaint was accepted by U.H., and White was referred to the
police. Id.
The key point is that U.H. knew that Wallace had made a racial
slur shortly after White complained to the arena manager because
Wallace had admitted doing so. Fact 29. Despite this knowledge,
U.H. treated the matter differently because of Wallace's
relationship to the coach. White felt uncomfortable and intimidated
during the meeting with the Wallace family because no other U.H.
representative was present. Fact 33. Wallace was not suspended in
accordance with the Student Athlete Handbook despite previous
disciplinary action taken against an African American player for
swearing at a coach. Fact 37. The team was instructed not to talk
to White any more. Id. Several of White's co-workers, who saw the
incident or learned about it in the media, questioned him about it.
Id. As a result, White became more upset and embarrassed about the
incident and how it was handled. Fact 38.
White had to persevere in order to obtain redress. He tried to
talk to the coach a few days later. Fact 39. The coach said that
no further action would be taken because his son had "suffered
enough" and advised White to "do what you have to do." Id. Then
White and his family spoke to the athletic director, who told White
that he thought the matter had been resolved and that no
disciplinary action had been taken against Wallace. Fact 40.
However, the athletic director agreed to discuss the matter with the
coach. Id. After doing so, it was decided that Wallace would be
suspended. Id. The athletic director then directed the arena
manager and assistant manager to submit written reports. Id.
Although Wallace was disciplined and no longer had to perform his
team manager duties, he continued to receive his athletic
scholarship. Fact 41. Thus far, U.H. has not publicly apologized
to White. Fact 45. Aside from a brief discussion of the incident
with arena staff and to treat people with respect, U.H. has not
conducted any training with coaches, student athletes, or arena
staff about public accommodations laws or procedures for handing
discrimination complaints. Fact 43. Because of the incident, White
is no longer involved with the basketball team as before (attending
practices, giving advice to players, inviting them home for meals,
or helping with their homework), Facts 9 and 14, and continues to
feel sad, hurt, and withdrawn. Fact 45. In light of U.H.'s actions
after the incident, which constitute failure to take immediate and
appropriate corrective action, the Commission believes that White
should receive compensatory damages of $20,000.00 for the emotional
distress he has suffered.
The Commission upholds the civil penalties in Conclusion of Law
B,2, and the equitable remedies in Conclusion of Law B,3, and adopts
and incorporates herein the Recommended Order as its Final Order
with the exception of paragraph 2, which is modified to increase the
damages against U.H. for emotional injuries resulting from its
failure to take immediate and appropriate corrective action after
Wallace's racial slur.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii
CLAUDIO SUYAT
Chairperson
ALLICYN HIKIDA TASAKA
Commissioner
__________________________________________________________________
FAYE KENNEDY
Commissioner
JACK LAW
Commissioner
HARRY YEE
Commissioner
Notice: Under H.R.S. 368-16(a), a complainant and respondent
shall have a right of appeal from a final order of the Commission by
filing an appeal with the circuit court within thirty (30) days of
service of an appealable order of the Commission.
----------------------------------------------------
footnotes:
1. During the first half of the game, White yelled comments
about the referees and opposing players. During the second half as
the team was trailing, White became frustrated and yelled comments
such as, "You're a dinosaur coach!" "You're blowing it!" "You
don't know what you're doing!" "Stupid move!" "Play your bench!"
"Put Woody [Woodrow Moore] in!" "You gotta use Woody, Woody can do
it!" "You can't coach talented players!" "Play your best players!"
Fact 18.
2. U.H. disagrees with the characterization of White's
remarks. See, Exceptions to Factual Findings, infra.
3. Because the Commission has jurisdiction under Chapters 368
and 489, U.H.'s arguments regarding the STLA are not applicable.
4. The Commission notes that under certain State employment
laws, services performed by a student at a university, who is
enrolled and regularly attending classes, for money or the provision
of board, lodging, or tuition is specifically excluded from the
definition of employment. See, H.R.S. 386-1 (subparagraph (3) of
definition of services not considered "employment" in workers'
compensation law); H.R.S. 383-7(9)(B) (unemployment benefits);
H.R.S. 392-5(9)(B) (temporary disability benefits). Thus, under
these laws, a student performing services would not be considered an
employee. The exclusions indicate that the students performing
services would fall under the definition of employment but for the
exemptions. Chapter 489 does not contain an exemption for students.
5. U.H. argues that the Student Athlete Handbook precludes
student athletes from using obscene and indecent language thereby
making Wallace's statements outside the scope of his authority.
This argument ignores the meeting of minds that Wallace was to do
things to assist the team. As long as he was acting within the
scope of that authority, U.H. cannot avoid being bound by his
actions carrying out that authority just because he may have
violated the Handbook.
6. Wallace used the term "nigger" because it was the "ugliest
thing he could say to hurt [White] at the time." Fact 21.
7. "Wallace knew that the word 'nigger' was a racist and
derogatory term for black people. Respondent Wallace was taught to
respect people of all races and did not believe that African
Americans were 'niggers' or inferior." Fact 21.
