380. Letter to researcher from Ted Gamble Clause, Deputy Attorney
     General, dated July 26, 1995, at 1-2.

381. Letter from John Tantlinger, Ed.D., Energy Planner for the
     Department of Business, Economic Development, and Tourism,
     to Wendell K. Kimura, Director, Legislative Reference
     Bureau, dated July 26, 1995, at 1.

382. Letter to researcher from Richard C. Botti, Executive Director of the Hawaii Automotive & Retail Gasoline Dealers
     Association, dated August 1, 1995, at 2.

383. Letter to researcher from Alec McBarnet, Jr., Vice President
     of the Hawaii Petroleum Marketers Association, dated August
     14, 1995, at 1.

384. Letter to researcher from Jennifer A. Aquino, Administrative
     Manager, Aloha Petroleum, Ltd., dated September 21, 1995, at 6.

385. Letter to researcher from R. A. Broderick, Western Region
     Business Manager, Shell Oil Products Company, dated July 31,
     1995, at 1, citing the United States Department of Justice's
     1980 report to the President concerning the gasoline
     shortage of 1979.

386. Id. at 1-2.

387. Letter from Susan A. Kusunoki, BHP Hawaii Inc., to Wendell
     K. Kimura, Director, Legislative Reference Bureau, dated
     August 10, 1995, at 1-2.

388. Letter from J. W. McElroy, Regional Manager, Chevron U.S.A.
     Products Co., to Wendell K. Kimura, Director, Legislative
     Reference Bureau, dated August 7, 1995, at 7.

389. Gregory R. Kirsch, "Note:  Hurricanes and Windfalls:
     Takings and Price Controls in Emergencies," 79 Va. L. Rev.
     1235, 1239-1241 (Aug. 1993) (footnotes omitted); Black's Law
     Dictionary, 5th ed. (St. Paul, MN:  West Publishing Co.,
     1979) at 1041.

390. Kirsch (1993) at 1241 (footnotes omitted); see text
     accompanying notes 25 to 39 in chapter 11 for a discussion
     of eminent domain.

391. See United States, President's Commission for a National
     Agenda for the Eighties, Panel on Government and the
     Regulation of Corporate and Individual Decisions, Government
     and the Regulation of Corporate and Individual Decisions in
     the Eighties (Washington, DC:  1980) (hereinafter,
     "President's Commission (1980)") at 15.

392. Even in emergency situations, it has been argued, price
     controls are not only ineffective but hurt consumers by
     giving rise to black markets or, if these are prevented by
     strict enforcement of price controls, queuing.  For example,
     Kirsch (1993) noted the following:
     
             When prices are held below their free market
        equilibrium level, black markets arise.  The
        "invisible hand" of profit-seeking forces an
        approximation of the free market price in the form of
        under-the-table payments, bribes, or "back-alley"
        sales at illegal prices.  Black market sellers demand
        prices even higher than the free market emergency
        price to compensate for the risk of being caught and
        punished, further exacerbating disaster victims'
        inability to afford needed goods.  Thus, price
        controls often result in a "double whammy":  consumers
        pay black market prices that are higher than the
        hypothetical free market equilibrium price, yet the
        quantity of goods supplied does not increase as it
        would under free market pricing because incentives to
        market entry are reduced by enforcement of price
        controls.
     
             Even if black markets are prevented by strict
        enforcement of the price controls, some new mechanism
        must perform the allocative function served by prices
        in a free market.  Queuing is the typical replacement
        mechanism by which scarce supplies are allocated when
        consumers cannot "vote with their wallets."  Queuing
        wastes human resources as consumers spend their time
        waiting in lines.  The government could put rationing
        mechanisms in place to allocate goods on a more
        logical basis than one's willingness to wait in line.
        But one suspects that government rationing, like
        queuing, involves "red tape," inefficiency, graft, and
        favoritism.  Thus, price controls do not help to get
        needed goods into the hands of disaster victims, and
        if effectively enforced, they will probably reduce the
        quantity of available goods.

     Id. at 1259-1260 (footnotes omitted); see also Hawaii,
     Department of Planning and Economic Development, Managing a 
     Gasoline Shortage in Hawaii (Honolulu:  Oct. 1981) at 42
     (vol. 1):  "The overriding effect of price controls is to
     sustain a shortage because price is not free to rise to
     choke off demand."
     
     The Hawaii Legislature, finding that "any severe disruption
     in petroleum product supplies for use within the State would
     cause grave hardship, pose a threat to the economic well-
     being of the people of the State, and have significant
     adverse effects upon public confidence and order and
     effective conservation of petroleum products...", has
     granted to the Governor or the Governor's representative the
     authority to control the distribution and sale of petroleum
     products in the event of a shortage or anticipated shortage
     of these products.  See Haw. Rev. Stat. §125C-1.  Among the
     powers granted to the governor are restricting the sale of
     petroleum products to specific days or hours, instituting a
     statewide rationing plan, and purchasing and reselling or
     otherwise distributing petroleum products.  Haw. Rev. Stat.
     §125C-3.  The state Department of Business, Economic
     Development, and Tourism is also required to prepare a
     biennial state energy emergency preparedness plan "to be
     implemented in the event of, or in anticipation of, a change
     in the State's petroleum supply or demand situation that is
     judged by the governor to be unmanageable by the free
     market."  Haw. Rev. Stat. §125C-31(a).  Counties must also
     prepare energy emergency preparedness plans in coordination
     and consistent with the state plan.  Haw. Rev. Stat. §125C-
     32.

393. Philip E. Sorensen, An Economic Analysis of the Distributor-
     Dealer Wholesale Gasoline Price Inversion of 1990:  The
     Effects of Different Contractual Relations (N.p., April
     1991) at 31 (footnote omitted):
     
        A price control system based on historical costs would
        require that the government establish and enforce
        complex accounting controls over refiner pricing.
        Such controls are economically justified only in a
        public utility setting, where the economic character
        of the industry are those of "natural monopoly" (i.e.,
        economies of scale which continue up to such large
        output levels that single-firm production is more
        efficient than production shared among any larger
        number of firms).
     
        But gasoline marketing does not fit the requirements
        of "natural monopoly".  Government price controls for
        gasoline markets are no more justified than for food
        retailing or the marketing of office machinery.  In
        these and other important U.S. industries, dual
        distribution is commonplace and serves to enhance
        efficiency by permitting various degrees of
        specialization to be adopted by sellers.  The
        flexibility and price-responsiveness provided by this
        system would be lost under a system of price controls,
        as would the commitment of American society to maximum
        freedom of markets.

394. Id.

395. H. A. Merklein and W. P. Murchison Jr., Those Gasoline Lines
     and How They Got There (Dallas:  Fisher Institute, 1980) at
     111.

396. Id.

397. See Robert Fenili, "The Impact of Decontrol on Gasoline
     Wholesalers and Retailers," Contemporary Policy Issues, vol.
     3, no. 3, pt. 2 (Spring, 1985) at 119-129; see also United
     States, Department of Energy, Deregulated Gasoline
     Marketing:  Consequences for Competition, Competitors, and
     Consumers (Washington, DC:  March 1984) (hereinafter, "DOE
     (1984)") at 33:  "Decontrol has brought about significant
     changes in the way oil companies are distributing their
     product.  These alterations in distribution strategy are in
     direct response to the confluence of factors affecting the
     industry--decreasing demand, increasing costs, and changing
     consumer buying patterns."  See generally id. at 33-53.

398. Sorensen (1991) at 31 ("Public utility-type regulation of
     gasoline prices would ... impose major new cost burdens on
     the refining and marketing industry, reducing its efficiency
     and leading to higher prices for its products.  Consumers
     would share a large part of these costs directly and
     indirectly in higher gasoline prices and higher taxes paid
     to support the regulatory bureaucracy.")

399. Id. at 31, 32.

400. Nancy D. Yamaguchi and David T. Isaak, Hawaii and the World
     Oil Market:  An Overview for Citizens and Policymakers
     (Honolulu:  East-West Center Energy Program, Aug. 1990) at
     76 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 76-77:
     
             To take an example of what might occur in Hawaii:
        Suppose that the government has assessed the
        "reasonable" cost of gasoline, either based on
        California prices plus some transport cost, or based
        on some formula that estimates what it costs the
        refiner to manufacture.  Then suppose that one of the
        refiners installs additional hydrocracking to meet a
        great increase in demand for jet fuel.  The
        hydrocracker will produce substantial quantities of
        naphtha as a "byproduct" (although in another state,
        it might be the jet fuel that was the "byproduct");
        with proper processing, this naphtha can be changed
        into gasoline.  If this gasoline is in excess of the
        needs of the local market, then it would have to be
        exported.  In this case, the free-market price locally
        would drop below the Californian price, probably by an
        amount equal to the transport cost.  The current
        regulated price would be too high, under either the
        formula approach of the "California plus transport"
        approach.
     
             Obviously, there would be a need for readjustment
        of the price.  But according to what?  To determine
        what would not be "fair," it would be necessary to
        look at the cost of the hydrocracker, and the sales
        price of the jet fuel that it produces.  Thus, the
        problem of setting the gasoline price hinges on the
        jet fuel prices.  Furthermore, only one of the
        refiners has installed this new equipment; should the
        other refiner be penalized (or receive additional
        benefits) based on the investment decisions taken by
        its competitor? ...

401. Id. at 77.

402. United States, General Accounting Office, Energy Security
     and Policy:  Analysis of the Pricing of Crude Oil and
     Petroleum Products (Washington, DC:  March 1993)
     (hereinafter, "GAO (1993)") at 127-128.  The GAO also cited
     anti-price-gouging laws, which prohibit refiners from
     charging excessively high prices for petroleum products.
     Citing statistics of the American Petroleum Institute, the
     GAO noted that in 1990, forty-two states had considered
     legislation regarding gasoline pricing; this number dropped
     to twenty-five the following year.  Between 1990 and 1991,
     petroleum pricing legislation was passed in five states:
     below-cost sales and minimum-markup laws in Florida,
     Montana, and Utah, and anti-price-gouging laws in
     Connecticut and Massachusetts.  Id. at 128.  The GAO further
     noted that states have proposed two other types of laws to
     deal with similar concerns, namely, divorcement and open-
     supply statutes.  Open supply proposals are discussed in
     chapter 4 of this study; retail divorcement is discussed in
     chapter 15.

403. See cases cited at Sixty Enterprises, Inc. v. Roman & Ciro,
     Inc., 601 So.2d 234, 237 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. of App. 1992).

404. Id. at 238 n. 7; see also Francis M. Dougherty, "Annotation:
     Validity, Construction, and Application of Statutory
     Provision Prohibiting Sales of Commodities Below Cost-
     -Modern Cases," 41 A.L.R. 4th 612, 617 (1985).

405. Haw. Rev. Stat. §481-1.  That section provides in pertinent
     part:
     
             §481-1  Unlawful practices.  It shall be unlawful
        for any person, firm, or corporation, doing business
        in the State and engaged in the production,
        manufacture, distribution, or sale of any commodity,
        or product, or service, or output of a service trade,
        of general use or consumption, or the product or
        service of any public utility, with the intent to
        destroy the competition of any regular established
        dealer in the commodity, product, or service, or to
        prevent the competition of any person, firm, private
        corporation, or municipal or other public corporation,
        who or which in good faith, intends and attempts to
        become such dealer, to discriminate between different
        sections, communities, or cities or portions thereof,
        or between different locations in such sections,
        communities, cities, or portions thereof in this
        State, by selling or furnishing the commodity,
        product, or services at a lower rate in one section,
        community, or city, or any portion thereof, or in one
        location in such section, community, or city or any
        portion thereof, than in another after making
        allowance for difference, if any, in the grade or
        quality, quantity and in the actual cost of
        transportation from the point of production, if a raw
        product or a commodity, or from the point of
        manufacture if a manufactured product or commodity,
        and in the overhead cost....
     
             This part shall not be construed to prohibit the
        meeting in good faith of the rates of a competitor as
        herein defined, selling the same article or product,
        or service or output of a service trade in the same
        locality or trade area, or to prevent a reasonable
        classification of service by public utilities for the
        purpose of establishing rates.
     
             The inhibition hereof against locality
        discrimination embraces any scheme of special rebates,
        collateral contracts, or any device of any nature
        whereby such discrimination is, in substance or fact,
        effected in violation of the spirit and intent of this
        part.

406. Haw. Rev. Stat. §481-3.  That section provides:
     
             §481-3  Sales at less than cost.  No person,
        partnership, firm, corporation, joint stock company,
        or other association engaged in business within the
        State shall sell, offer for sale, or advertise for
        sale any article, or product, or service or output of
        a service trade, at less than the cost thereof to such
        vendor, or give, offer to give, or advertise with the
        intent to give away any article or product, or service
        or output of a service trade, with the intent to
        destroy competition.
     
             The term "cost" as applied to production includes
        the cost of raw materials, labor, and all overhead
        expenses of the producer; and as applied to
        distribution "cost" means and includes the invoice
        cost of the merchandise to a distributor or the
        replacement cost of the merchandise to a distributor,
        whichever is lower; less all trade discounts except
        customary discounts for cash; to which shall be added
        (1) freight charges not otherwise included in the
        invoice cost or the replacement cost of the
        merchandise as herein set forth, and (2) cartage to
        the distributor outlet if done or paid for by the
        distributor, and (3) a markup to cover a proportionate
        part of the cost of doing business, which markup, in
        the absence of proof of a lesser cost, shall be six
        per cent of the cost to the distributor as herein set
        forth after adding thereto freight charges and cartage
        but before adding thereto a markup; provided that in
        the case where a person, partnership, corporation, or
        association is engaged in the business or makes sales
        both at retail and wholesale, the "invoice cost"
        includes all elements recognized by good accounting
        practice as proper elements of the cost; provided
        further that taxes passed on to a purchaser as a
        separate item from the price of merchandise shall be
        included in the advertised price or offer of sale of
        the merchandise if such taxes are used to compute the
        markup of six per cent as provided herein.
     
             The "cost of doing business" or "overhead
        expense" means all costs of doing business incurred in
        the conduct of the business and includes without
        limitation the following items of expense: labor
        (including salaries of executive officers), rent,
        interest on borrowed capital, depreciation, selling
        cost, maintenance of equipment, delivery costs, credit
        losses, all types of licenses, taxes, insurance, and
        advertising.

407. Haw. Rev. Stat. §481-6.  That section provides as follows:
     
             §481-6  When sale at less than cost permitted.
        Sections 481-3 to 481-5 shall not apply to any sale
        made:
     
             (1)  In closing out in good faith the owner's
                  stock or any part thereof for the purpose of
                  discontinuing the owner's trade in any such
                  stock or commodity, and in the case of the
                  sale of seasonal goods, or to the bona fide
                  sale of perishable goods to prevent loss to
                  the vendor by spoilage or depreciation,
                  provided notice is given to the public
                  thereof;
     
             (2)  When the goods are damaged or deteriorated
                  in quality, and notice is given to the
                  public thereof;
     
             (3)  By an officer acting under the orders of any
                  court;
     
             (4)  In an endeavor made in good faith to meet
                  the lawful prices of a competitor, as herein
                  defined, selling the same article or
                  product, or service or output of a service
                  trade, in the same locality or trade area;
     
             (5)  By the government or any agency thereof, of
                  the United States, the State, or any county,
                  or by post exchanges or ships' service
                  stores operating under and in accordance
                  with United States army or naval
                  regulations.
     
             In case of any sale at less than cost which does
        not fall within (1) to (5) of this section, the burden
        of proof shall be on the defendant to show that the
        sale was not made for the purpose of injuring
        competitors and destroying competition within the
        meaning of this part.
     
        Any person, firm, or corporation who performs
        work upon, renovates, alters, or improves any personal
        property belonging to another person, firm, or
        corporation, shall be construed to be a vendor within
        the meaning of this part.

408. See, e.g., Rayola Dougher and Thomas F. Hogarty, The Impact
     of State Legislation on the Number of Retail Gasoline
     Outlets, Research Study #062 (Washington, DC:  American
     Petroleum Institute, Oct. 1991) at 1, 7:
     
             General laws requiring minimum markups or
        prohibiting sales "below-cost" are on the books in
        about one-half of the states, but "below-cost" selling
        laws specific to gasoline existed in about nine states
        during the mid-1980s.  These specific laws were
        promulgated in response to claims by retailer
        representatives that major refiners use company-
        operated outlets to sell motor gasoline at prices
        "below-cost," and thus put them out of business.
        Proponents have argued that "below-cost sales" laws,
        if effectively designed and enforced, would preserve
        the number of outlets selling gasoline.

409. Tenn. Code Ann. §47-25-611(a)(1) (1994).

410. Tenn. Code Ann. §47-25-603(b) (1994):
     
             Independent and small dealers and distributors of
        petroleum and related products are vital to a healthy,
        competitive marketplace, but are unable to survive
        subsidized below-cost pricing at the retail level by
        others, who have other sources of income.  Below-cost
        selling laws have been effective in preserving
        independent and small retailers and wholesalers in
        other trades and businesses from subsidized pricing.
        Subsidized pricing is inherently unfair and
        destructive to, and reduces competition in, the motor
        fuel marketing industry, and is a form of predatory
        pricing.  An additional purpose of this part is to
        prevent and eliminate subsidized pricing of petroleum
        and related products.
     
     See also D. E. Jones and A. M. Alfano, "Injury to
     Competitors Is Injury to Competition:  Predatory Pricing
     Under State Law," 24 Antitrust L. & Econ. Rev. 57 (Summer
     1992).

411. Mont. Code Ann. §30-14-802 (1993); see also Utah Code Ann.
     §§13-16-1 to 13-16-12 (Michie 1994) ("Motor Fuel Marketing
     Act").

412. Sixty Enterprises, Inc., 601 So.2d at 235 n. 1.

413. Fla. Stat. Ann. §526-304(1)(a) and (b) (West 1995).

414. Fla. Stat. Ann. §526-304(2)(a) and (b) (West 1995).

415. Fla. Stat. Ann. §526-302 (West 1988):
     
             The Legislature finds that fair and healthy
        competition in the marketing of motor fuel provides
        maximum benefits to consumers in this state, and that
        certain marketing practices which impair such
        competition are contrary to the public interest.
        Predatory practices and, under certain conditions,
        discriminatory practices, are unfair trade practices
        and restraints which adversely affect motor fuel
        competition.  It is the intent of the Legislature to
        encourage competition and promote the general welfare
        of citizens of this state by prohibiting such unfair
        practices.

     The constitutionality of Florida's Motor Fuel Marketing
     Practices Act was upheld by Florida's third district court
     of appeal, finding that the Act was "rationally related to
     furthering the legislature's legitimate objective of
     protecting competition in the retail motor fuel market by
     prohibiting predatory pricing practices which the
     legislature has determined are unfair."  Sixty Enterprises,
     Inc., 601 So.2d at 238-239.  The court further noted that
     "[i]t is beyond question that protecting competition is in
     the public interest and is an important objective of both
     state and federal legislative bodies.  Healthy competition
     is valued because it increases the economic benefits to the
     public as a whole."  Id. at 236-237 (footnote omitted).

416. For example, Dougher and Hogarty (1991) cited studies
     indicating that below-cost sales laws that are specific to
     gasoline sales raise prices by limiting price competition:
     
             A study of general below-cost selling laws that
        applied to gasoline sales in 24 metropolitan areas
        found that retail gasoline prices were higher in these
        areas than in 19 metropolitan areas without below-cost
        laws.  Even after accounting for a range of other
        factors, the study found that prices for all grades
        and types of service examined were consistently higher
        in states with below-cost laws than in states without
        them. ...
     
             A study of below-cost laws specific to gasoline
        sales in three such states found the same results;
        below-cost laws raised prices by limiting price
        competition.  Motor gasoline prices were found to have
        increased in states after implementation of "below-
        cost" selling laws relative to gasoline prices in
        nearby states without similar legislation.  Moreover,
        the study also showed that within the states with
        "below-cost" laws, resellers recorded greater price
        increases on average than did major refiners.  This
        result suggested that marketers' pricing practices
        were those affected most by such laws, an outcome
        expected if aggressive price competition by chain
        retailers were stifled.  Thus, while such laws are
        designed to prevent predatory price cutting, their
        impact on consumers was found to be adverse.

     Id. at 8 (footnotes omitted).  They further noted that the
     results were inconclusive regarding the impact of minimum-
     markup and below-cost sales laws on the number of retail
     gasoline outlets.  In a comparison of the percentage change
     in the number of outlets in states prohibiting below-cost
     sales with the percentage change in corresponding regional
     and national totals from 1977 to 1987, Dougher and Hogarty
     found that "only five of the nine 'below-cost' states
     experienced changes that suggest the possibility of the
     preservation or growth of outlets when comparisons are made
     with regional averages."  Id.

417. See note 72 and accompanying text in chapter 15.

418. See, e.g., T. Crawford Honeycutt, "Competition in Controlled
     and Uncontrolled Gasoline Markets," Contemporary Policy
     Issues, vol. 3, no. 3, pt. 2 (Spring, 1985) at 107.
     Honeycutt maintained, however, that "minimum-markup laws
     protect high-cost firms from the competition of low-cost
     firms...", and concluded that "protectionist legislation,
     such as minimum-markup requirements or divorcement,
     inevitably forces consumers to support less efficient
     marketers and reduces competition."  Id. at 107, 117.

419. DOE (1984) at 107.

420. Id. (footnote omitted).

421. See id. at 107-108.

422. Id. at 108.

423. Id. at 109 (footnotes omitted):
     
             To the extent that minimum markup laws restrain
        gasoline marketers from lowering prices and
        introducing more efficient distribution methods, they
        result in higher prices to the consumer.  Some
        consumers may benefit from increased services, frills,
        and promotional deals as marketers turn to nonprice
        forms of competition.  On the other hand, consumers
        who do not value these services will be denied the
        option of foregoing them in order to purchase gasoline
        at lower prices.  In effect, minimum markup
        legislation forces consumers to purchase less gasoline
        (because of the higher price) and more service
        (because of increased nonprice competition) than they
        would under free market conditions.  Minimum markup
        legislation reduces consumer welfare because it does
        not allow consumers to optimize their consumption decisions.
     
             Minimum markup legislation may restrain the
        introduction of new gasoline marketing methods that
        not only involve less service, but also are more
        efficient than traditional methods.  To the extent
        that prices are higher because minimum markup laws
        present a barrier to the entry of more efficient
        distribution systems, the laws impose a cost on
        consumers that is not offset by other factors such as
        increased service.  Thus, consumers may have to pay
        higher prices not only because they are forced to pay
        for more service than they would consume in a free
        market, but also because they are denied the benefits
        of more efficient new distribution and marketing
        methods.
     
             Finally, it should be noted that significant
        costs would be involved in effective enforcement of
        minimum markup laws.  The laws tend to be vague and
        complex, resulting in costly legal proceedings.  Given
        the poor history of effectiveness of minimum markup
        and fair trade legislation in general, it is doubtful
        that any benefits from the legislation would be worth
        the cost.

424. The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides:
     "nor shall any State ... deny to any person within its
     jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."  Article I,
     section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution provides that "[n]o
     person shall be ... denied the equal protection of the
     laws....".

425. Hasegawa v. Maui Pineapple Co., 52 Haw. 327, 329 (1970)
     (citations and footnote omitted); see also Allied Stores of
     Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527-528:
     
          The guarantee of the equal protection of the laws,
     found in both the Hawaii and Federal Constitutions, was
     not intended to interfere with the power of the State to
     prescribe regulations to promote the general welfare of
     the people.  Nor was it intended that the demand for
     equal protection require that all laws apply universally
     to all persons and that they never classify when imposing
     special burdens upon or granting special benefits to
     distinct groups.  It has been recognized that a state
     cannot function without classifying its citizens for
     various purposes and treating some differently from
     others. ...  However, in exercising this right to
     classify in order to achieve social goals the legislature
     may not act arbitrarily; that is, the classification must
     be reasonable in relation to the purpose of the
     legislation.

426. Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 571 (1993), reconsideration
     granted in part, 74 Haw. 650 (1993) (citations omitted).

427. Id. at 572 (citation omitted); Richardson v. Sport Shinko
     (Waikiki Corp.), 76 Haw. 494, 516 (1994).

428. Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. at 572 (citation omitted).

429. Housing Finance and Development Corporation v. Castle, 1995
     WL 307742 (Hawaii) (May 19, 1995), slip op. at 15 (citation
     omitted).

430. Kaneohe Bay Cruises, Inc. v. Hirata, 75 Haw. 250, 260 (1993)
     (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).

431. 437 U.S. 117 (1978).

432. Id. at 124-125 (1978) (citations and footnote omitted).

	Chapter 10	Chapter 11