REGULATING HAWAII'S
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY

Endnotes 14


538. Letter to researcher from Ted Gamble Clause, Deputy Attorney
     General, August 31, 1995, at 2.

539. Letter from John Tantlinger, Ed.D., Energy Planner,
     Department of Business, Economic Development, and Tourism,
     to Wendell K. Kimura, Director, Legislative Reference
     Bureau, September 1, 1995, at 2.

540. Letter to researcher from Richard C. Botti, Hawaii
     Automotive and Retail Gasoline Dealers Association, Sept. 1,
     1995, at 1.

541. Letter to researcher from Alec McBarnet, Jr., Vice
     President, Hawaii Petroleum Marketers Association, dated
     Sept. 7, 1995, at 1-2.

542. Letter to researcher from Jennifer A. Aquino, Administrative
     Manager, Aloha Petroleum, Ltd., dated September 21, 1995, at
     9-10.

543. Letter to researcher from R. A. Broderick, Western Region
     Business Manger, Shell Oil Products Co., dated August 31,
     1995, at 2.

544. Letter from Susan A. Kusunoki, BHP Hawaii, to Wendell K.
     Kimura, Director, Legislative Reference Bureau, dated
     September 8, 1995, at 1-2.

545. Letter from J. W. McElroy, Regional Manager, Chevron U.S.A.
     Products Co., to Wendell K. Kimura, Director, Legislative
     Reference Bureau, dated August 7, 1995, at 9.

546. See generally Sanford Inouye, Small Business:  Current
     Problems and Opportunities, Report No. 4 (Honolulu:
     Legislative Reference Bureau, 1988); Thomas Kaser, "Hawaii
     Firms Moving to Cheaper Pastures," The Honolulu Advertiser,
     August 4, 1995, p. B1; see also Belden Daniels, Nancy Barbe,
     and Harry Lirtzman, "Small Business and State Economic
     Development," in Expanding the Opportunity to Produce:
     Revitalizing the American Economy Through New Enterprise
     Development, ed. Robert Friedman and William Schweke
     (Washington, DC:  The Corporation for Enterprise
     Development, 1981); Steven Holtzman, Alternative State
     Policies in Aid of Small Business (Columbus:  Ohio
     Legislative Services Commission, July 1991); Richard J. Judd
     and Barbra K. Sanders, "Regulation, Small Business, and
     Economic Development:  A Historical Perspective on
     Regulation of Business," in Small Business in a Regulated
     Economy:  Issues and Policy Implications,  ed. Richard J.
     Judd, William T. Greenwood, and Fred W. Becker (New York:
     Quorum Books, 1988); and Roger J. Vaughan, Small and New
     Business Development:  An Action Guide for State Governments
     (Prepared for the Coalition of Northeastern Governors Policy
     Research Center, Washington, DC:  May 1983).

547. California, Office of Economic Policy, Planning and
     Research, State Regulation and Economic Development
     (Sacramento:  1982) at 15-17:

             A great deal of the recent political opposition
        to regulations of all kinds has come from small
        business organizations.  In general, small firms
        assert that regulations which require equal results
        from firms of all sizes impose extra burdens on
        smaller firms due to economies of scale in equipment
        or other changes required, and in the maintenance of
        specialized staff required to monitor regulations and
        select the most efficient method of response.  Thus,
        it is argued, the unit cost of response is higher for
        small firms than large firms.  This has led to calls
        for "two-tiered regulation" in which small firms are
        exempted from regulation or face less stringent
        requirements.  The increased interest in the effects
        of regulation on small business coincides with
        research findings which argue that smaller firms are
        the source of a majority of net new job creation.
        These research findings are now frequently mentioned
        in regulatory proceedings by small business advocates
        as a reason to reduce regulation.

     See also Paul Sommers and Roland J. Cole, "The Costs of
     Complying with Government Requirements:  Are Small Firms
     Disproportionately Impacted?" in Small Business in a
     Regulated Economy:  Issues and Policy Implications, ed.
     Richard J. Judd, William T. Greenwood, and Fred W. Becker
     (New York:  Quorum Books, 1988).

548. Walter Miklius and Sumner J. LaCroix, Divorcement
     Legislation and the Impact on Gasoline Retailing in the
     United States and Hawaii (Honolulu:  University of Hawaii,
     Jan. 20, 1993) at 31 (footnote omitted).

549. Specifically, all USTs must be single-walled, corrosion-
     protected, equipped with leak detection monitors, and
     contain spill-and-overfill catch basins, while all new tank
     installations must be epoxy-coated with cathodially
     protected steel, fiberglass-reinforced plastic, or
     fiberglass-coated steel.  Existing tanks may be upgraded by
     adding cathodially-protected systems, installing interior
     lining, or both.  Since UST piping is the most common source
     of leaks, upgrading of piping systems is required to meet
     corrosion requirements.  EPA cost estimates for a leak
     detection system range from $3,000 to $8,000 for a station
     with three 5,000-gallon tanks; retrofitting existing tanks
     with cathodic protection range costs from $10,000 to
     $40,000; and three new 10,000 gallon single wall tanks cost
     between $76,000 and $100,000.  Id.

550. The Hawaii Department of Health (1990) reported that the
     majority of tanks in Hawaii (seventy-three percent) are made
     of steel; only twelve percent of these have cathodic
     protection or an internal lining.  The piping for forty-one
     percent of all UST systems is made from galvanized steel,
     while 11 percent of the piping uses bare steel.
     Approximately ninety-seven percent of the piping does not
     have cathodic protection.  EPA technical standards require
     that all tanks and piping be upgraded by December, 1998, to
     include cathodic protection and spill and overflow devices,
     or be replaced and to have leak detection equipment.
     Moreover, the average age of tanks in Hawaii is eighteen
     years, which is somewhat older than the average age for 
     tanks nationwide, and more than seventy-five percent are
     older than nine years.  Because most older tanks are
     constructed of bare steel, they are less likely to have
     corrosion protection or leak detection devices than new
     tanks, making them more likely to leak.  See Hawaii,
     Department of Health, On Act 317, Session Laws of Hawaii,
     1990 Requesting a Study on the Development of a State
     Financial Assurance Fund Program for Owners and Operators of
     Underground Storage Tanks (Honolulu:  Dec. 27, 1990) at ES-2
     (hereinafter, "DOH (1990)").

551. The Department also found that seven major oil companies own
     approximately 30 percent of USTs, while federal, state, and
     local government entities own about 16 percent of USTs.
     Although the average tank capacity of tanks in the State is
     about 60,000 gallons, about 40 percent have a capacity of
     less than 1,100 gallons.  DOH (1990) at ES-3.

552. DOH (1990) at ES-3 to ES-4; see also John S. Conniff and
     Charles G. Gavigan, "Preserving Rural Gas Stations:  State
     Financial Assistance for Underground Petroleum Storage
     Tanks," 15 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 71 (Fall, 1991).

553. DOH (1990) at ES-3:

             The geology of Hawaii is drastically different
        from that of the contiguous states with widely varying
        conditions among the islands. ...
     
             Hawaii is highly dependent on ground water (over
        95 percent of Hawaii's drinking water comes from
        ground water).  In Honolulu, where approximately two-
        thirds of the USTs in Hawaii are located, depth to
        ground water is between 5 and 20 feet.
     
             The soil types in Oahu and the other islands are
        highly permeable.  The soil in Oahu is a combination
        of alluvial deposits and coral fills.  It resembles
        sand in permeability.  The soil on the younger islands
        (i.e. Maui and the island of Hawaii) is largely
        volcanic.  The permeability of these basaltic soils
        exceeds that of most other soil-types.  A large
        percentage of the remaining one-third of the USTs in
        Hawaii (i.e. USTs not located in Honolulu) are located
        on these younger islands.  In these soils, releases
        move rapidly toward the ground water, creating more
        contamination and increasing cleanup costs.
     
             Overall, Hawaii has a high ground-water table,
        and highly permeable soil in the areas where most USTs
        are located.  Because of these hydrogeological
        conditions, an UST release poses a greater risk to
        human health and the environment than it would in
        areas with a deeper ground-water table.

554. Id.  The Department noted that "[g]roundwater wells and
     drinking wells are typically installed inland and not along
     the coast.  Because development is mostly along the coastal
     regions of the islands, contamination from development and
     UST releases may have a reduced effect on drinking water
     wells."  Id. at ES-3 n. 6.

555. Miklius and LaCroix (1993) at 32, citing United States v.
     Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F.Supp. 955 (S.D. Ga. 1988), aff'd
     and remanded, 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).

556. Miklius and LaCroix (1993) at 32-33.  Anecdotal evidence in
     Hawaii also suggests that EPA regulations concerning UST
     requirements and clean-up necessitated the closure of many
     service stations:

        ... A station in Hilo was suddenly closed at the end
        of the lease because the owner did not want the risk
        of having to clean up the property in case it became
        polluted.  Developers in Kakaako are finding out that
        the clean-up from the pollution caused by small repair
        shops and gas tanks is extremely costly in terms of
        cleaning the sites and construction delays.
     
             Of the twenty-three stations interviewed on the
        Big Island, eight have closed gas operations or plan
        to because of the new regulations concerning tank
        replacement costs and insurance.  Three on Maui have
        stopped pumping gasoline or plan to, one has pulled
        his tanks on Kauai and on Oahu only two dealers
        indicated that they would be stopping gas sales, all
        based on this problem.

     Julia E. Schoen, The Consumer and Gasoline Marketing in
     Hawaii:  The Impact of Direct Retailing of Motor Fuel by
     Refiners and Distributors on the Consumer (Honolulu:
     Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs, 1992) at 5.

557. See Miklius and LaCroix (1993) at 33.  Hawaii's financial
     responsibility law with respect to USTs, section 342L-36,
     HRS, requires the Department of Health to adopt requirements
     for maintaining evidence of financial responsibility for
     taking response action and compensating third parties for
     bodily injury and property damage caused by an accidental
     release, and allows the Department to establish the amount
     of required coverage for particular classes or categories of
     underground storage tanks or tank systems containing
     petroleum at not less than $1,000,000 for each occurrence.

558. United States, General Accounting Office, Underground
     Petroleum Tanks:  Owners' Ability to Comply with EPA's
     Financial Responsibility Requirements (Washington:  July
     1990) (hereinafter, "GAO (1990)") at 9.

          EPA regulations divide underground petroleum storage
          tank owners into four categories based primarily on the
          number of tanks that they own.  Category 3 includes
          owners of 13 to 99 tanks, while category 4 includes
          owners of 1 to 12 tanks and most nonmarketers, i.e.,
          owners who do not market petroleum products and have a
          tangible net worth of less than $20,000,000.  See GAO
          (1990) at 1-2.  The GAO's 1990 survey of category-3 and
          -4 tank owners found that nearly one-third of state
          officials indicated that more than half of the
          category-3 firms would not be able to comply with the
          EPA's financial responsibility deadlines by the April
          1990 deadline, while over two-thirds of the officials
          stated that more than half of the category-4 firms
          would not be able to meet the October 1990 deadline,
          usually citing the following reasons for inability to
          comply:  "(1) high trust fund deductibles (for states
          with funds); (2) costly insurance; (3) old, high-risk
          tanks; and (4) technical requirements such as those
          necessitating costly tank improvements...."  GAO (1990)
          at 15.
     
          A similar survey conducted by the Hawaii Department of
          Health (1990) to assess the impact of the federal
          financial responsibility requirements on owners and
          operators of petroleum USTs in Hawaii found that
          approximately half of the respondents had obtained the
          required level of financial assurance.  Although at the
          time of the survey only two of the compliance deadlines
          had passed, and owners and operators of fewer than one
          hundred tanks did not have to comply, about one-quarter
          of the respondents--mostly independent owners and
          operators, some local government entities, and small
          petroleum marketers and nonmarketers--expressed
          difficulty in obtaining the required coverage due to
          the general unavailability of private insurance.
          Respondents cited such difficulties as the lack of
          available insurance coverage for both corrective action
          and third-party liability costs, high deductibles and
          large premiums for policies offered, the unwillingness
          of insurers to cover USTs, and the high cost of meeting
          stringent underwriting requirements.  See DOH (1990) at
          ES-4.

559. Miklius and LaCroix (1993) at 33.  As states have developed
     trust funds, private insurance to cover USTs has
     disappeared, and state funds themselves are running out of
     money.  See Allison R. Hayward, "Common Law Remedies and the
     UST Regulations", 21 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 619, 665-666
     (Summer 1994); see id. at 655-656 (footnotes omitted):
     
             Most states have established funds to clean up
        tank sites and compensate victims.  These funds take
        the place of the financial responsibility requirement
        in federal law.  Usually, the fund's budget is
        supplied by a tax on fuel sales.  In such a case, a
        tension exists between cleaning up sites in cases
        where no liable and financially capable party can be
        assigned the costs, and keeping the fuel tax level.
        In addition, clean-up contractors wary of their own
        liability seek to provide expensive and extensive
        remediation rather than control costs.
     
             Some states seek to control fund expenditures by
        placing deductibles on enterprises that are large
        enough to be self-insured.  Others place strict
        guidelines on what permits a tank owner must acquire
        before he can be reimbursed for site remediation.
        Even so, state funds run out of money.  In Michigan,
        for example, the state receives $4 million every month
        in fee revenue for its fund to cover payments of $15-
        17 million in requests.  At the end of fiscal year
        1992, Florida's fund held a balance of $24 million,
        but $139 million in claims had been filed against it.
        Even in states with solvent fund programs, the state
        is slow to reimburse claims.  A recent study estimates
        that these state funds have collected $900 million a
        year in fees, but have paid out only $926 million, and
        only 44,000 sites have been cleaned up, an estimated
        ten percent of the total.  EPA has yet to promulgate
        regulations to address what happens when state funds
        that replace private liability requirements under the
        UST regulations become insolvent.

560. Miklius and LaCroix (1993) at 34.

561. See, e.g., Ellen Paris, "Out of Gas," in Hawaii Investor,
     vol. 12, no. 9 (Sept. 1992) at 36 (noting that Unocal's
     Kahala service station, at the corner of Waialae Avenue and
     Hunakai Street in Honolulu, closed one year before its lease
     expired to allow time for site cleanup).

562. Miklius and LaCroix (1993) at 34.

563. 1990 Haw. Sess. Laws, Act 317, §2, codified as Haw. Rev.
     Stat. §342L-36.5.

564. DOH (1990) at ES-4 to ES-5.

565. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code chapter 70.148 (1994); DOH (1980)
     at 4-6.  The purpose of Washington's program is "to provide
     pollution liability reinsurance at a price that will
     encourage a private insurance company or risk retention
     group to sell pollution liability insurance ... to owners
     and operators of underground petroleum storage tanks,
     thereby allowing owners and operators to comply with the
     financial responsibility regulations of the EPA."  Wash.
     Rev. Code §70.148.005(2) (1994).  The program is funded by a
     tax on petroleum products to be used to make payments on the
     reinsurance contract.  See Wash. Rev. Code chapter 82.23A
     (1994).  The pollution liability insurance agency, which was
     simultaneously created to administer the program and
     scheduled to sunset in 1995, was reauthorized and extended
     to 2001 in the 1995 legislative session.  See Wash. Rev.
     Code §70.148.030 (1994); Council of State Governments,
     Environments West (Spring 1995) at 11.  The director of that
     agency is authorized to expend up to $15,000,000 for the
     financial assistance program.  Wash. Rev. Code
     §70.148.020(3) (1994).

          Washington's trust fund also provides financial
          assistance for corrective action in small communities,
          both to prevent supply disruptions and to maintain the
          economic viability of rural communities.  Wash. Rev.
          Code §70.148.120 (1994) provides in pertinent part:

        [T]he state has enacted laws designed to limit and
        prevent environmental damage and risk to public health
        and safety caused by underground petroleum storage
        tank leaks.  Because of the costs associated with
        compliance with such laws and the high costs
        associated with correcting past environmental damage,
        many owners and operators of underground petroleum
        storage tanks have discontinued the use of or have
        planned to discontinue the use of such tanks.  As a
        consequence, isolated communities face the loss of
        their sources of motor fuel and face the risk that the
        owner or operator will have insufficient funds to take
        corrective action for pollution caused by past leaks
        from the tanks.  In particular, rural communities face
        the risk that essential emergency, medical, fire and
        police services may be disrupted through the
        diminution or elimination of local sellers of
        petroleum products and by the closure of underground
        storage tanks owned by local government entities
        serving those communities.
     
             The legislature also recognizes as a fundamental
        government purpose the need to preserve a minimum
        level of economic viability in rural communities so
        that public revenues generated from economic activity
        are sufficient to sustain necessary governmental
        functions.  The closing of local service stations
        adversely affects local economies by reducing or
        eliminating reasonable access to fuel for
        agricultural, commercial, and transportation needs.

     To assist small communities, the legislature authorized
     cities and counties to certify that a local private owner or
     operator of an underground storage tank met a "vital local
     government, public health or safety need", qualifying the
     owner or operator for financial assistance.  Wash. Rev. Code
     §70.148.120(1) (1994).  In addition, local government
     entities may also obtain financial assistance for local
     government USTs.  Wash. Rev. Code §70.148.120(2) (1994).

566. DOH (1980) at 3-12 to 3-16.

567. Id. at 3-17 to 3-21.

568. 1991 Haw. Sess. Laws, Act 267, §2.  Under the capital loan
     program, the state Department of Business, Economic
     Development, and Tourism may make direct loans to small
     business concerns "for the financing of plant construction,
     conversion, expansion, the acquisition of land for
     expansion, the acquisition of equipment, machinery,
     supplies, or materials, or for the supplying of working
     capital."  Haw. Rev. Stat. §210-6 (1994).

569. 1992 Haw. Sess. Laws, Act 259, §33.

570. Miklius and LaCroix (1993) at 28, 59; United States,
     Department of Energy, Deregulated Gasoline Marketing:
     Consequences for Competition, Competitors, and Consumers
     (Washington, DC:  March 1984) (hereinafter, "DOE (1984)") at
     58-60.

571. See Miklius and LaCroix (1993) at 28-29, 59-60.

572. Id. at 28, citing DOE (1984) at 56-61.  The DOE (1984) also
     noted that greater consumer price awareness may have
     contributed to pressures for rent increases:

        With the increase in the price of gasoline, consumers
        have become much more price conscious.  They are more
        willing to shop around for the best price.  Added to
        this willingness is the perception that gasoline is a
        fungible commodity, that is, there are few differences
        among major brands or between branded and unbranded
        gasoline.  As a result, refiners are less able to
        maintain a wide price spread for similar grades of
        gasoline among brands [or] between branded and
        unbranded gasoline.  Refiners cannot put large rent
        increases into the DTW price [of] gasoline and expect
        to remain competitive.  DOE (1984) at 60-61.

573. DOE (1984) at iii; Miklius and LaCroix (1993) at 29.

574. Miklius and LaCroix (1993) at 29-31, 60.

575. Schoen (1992) at 5.

576. Paris (1992) at 34.


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