308. Letter to researcher from Ted Gamble Clause, Deputy Attorney
     General, Department of the Attorney General, dated July 21,
     1995, at 3, citing Hawaii, Department of the Attorney
     General, An Investigation of Gasoline Prices in Hawaii:  A
     Preliminary Report (Honolulu:  Sept. 1990) at 23
     (hereinafter, "AG (1990)").

309. Id.

310. Letter to researcher from Ted Gamble Clause, Deputy Attorney
     General, dated July 26, 1995, at 4; AG (1990) at 23.

311. Letter from John Tantlinger, Ed.D., Energy Planner for the
     Department of Business, Economic Development, and Tourism,
     to Wendell K. Kimura, Director, Legislative Reference
     Bureau, dated June 13, 1995, at 2-3.

312. Letter from John Tantlinger, Ed.D., Energy Planner for the
     Department of Business, Economic Development, and Tourism,
     to Wendell K. Kimura, Director, Legislative Reference
     Bureau, dated July 26, 1995, at 4.

313. Letter to researcher from Richard C. Botti, Executive
     Director of the Hawaii Automotive & Retail Gasoline Dealers
     Association, dated July 1, 1995, at 4.

314. Letter to researcher from Richard C. Botti, Executive
     Director of the Hawaii Automotive and Retail Gasoline
     Dealers Association, dated August 1, 1995, at 3.

315. Letter to researcher from Alec McBarnet, Jr., Vice
     President, Hawaii Petroleum Marketers Association, dated
     July 7, 1995, at 3.

316. Letter to researcher from Alec McBarnet, Jr., Vice President
     of the Hawaii Petroleum Marketers Association, August 14,
     1995, at 2 (emphasis in original).

317. Letter to researcher from Jennifer A. Aquino, Administrative
     Manager, Aloha Petroleum, Ltd., September 21, 1995, at 4.

318. Id. at 8.

319. Letter to researcher from R. A. Broderick, Western Region
     Business Manager, Shell Oil Products Company, dated June 30,1995,
     at 5, citing Hawaii, Department of the Attorney
     General, The Attorney General's 1994 Interim Report on the
     *Investigation of Gasoline Prices (Honolulu:  1994) at 10
     ("[T]he non-refiner incumbents could send gasoline to
     Hawaii....  But if they did, the additional gasoline they
     would supply to Hawaii, because of the inelastic demand for
     gasoline, would likely reduce the market price to the point
     of unprofitability....").

320. Letter to researcher from R. A. Broderick, Western Region
     Business Manager, Shell Oil Products Company, dated July 31,
     1995, at 4.

321. Letter to Wendell K. Kimura, Director, Legislative Reference
     Bureau, from Susan A. Kusunoki, Manager of State
     Governmental Activities, BHP Hawaii Inc., dated July 18,
     1995, at 3-5.

322. Letter from Susan A. Kusunoki, BHP Hawaii Inc., to Wendell
     K. Kimura, Director, Legislative Reference Bureau, August
     10, 1995, at 5-6.

323. Letter from J. W. McElroy, Regional Manager, Chevron U.S.A.
     Products Co., to Wendell K. Kimura, Director, Legislative
     Reference Bureau, dated August 7, 1995, at 4, 8.

324. Member countries of the International Energy Agency agreed
     to establish an emergency reserve of oil of ninety days of
     the previous year's imports by 1980; by 1985, the U.S.
     program sought to maintain reserves of at least one billion
     barrels.  See Thomas C. Schelling, Thinking Through the
     Energy Problem (New York, NY:  Committee for Economic
     Development, 1979) at 28.

325. Bruce W. Wilson, A Review of Factors Relating to the
     Establishment of a Regional Petroleum Reserve in Hawaii
     (Honolulu:  Department of Business and Economic Development,
     Nov. 1988) at vii.

326. In particular, Wilson cited the following points in favor of
     the establishment of a regional petroleum reserve in the
     State:

     .  A Regional Petroleum Reserve (RPR) should be sited in
        Hawaii to protect the economy of the State, to ensure 
        the security of the citizens of the State, and to
        provide for the national defense.  Relatively low oil
        prices would dictate that an RPR in Hawaii be sited
        and filled with volumes equal to 90 days of
        consumption as soon as possible.
     
     .  RPRs were enacted under the Energy Policy and
        Conservation Act (EPCA) of 1975.  Section 157(c)
        conferred discretionary authority on the Secretary of
        DOE to establish RPRs--in lieu of central SPR storage-
        -in insular or petroleum import-dependent areas of the
        U.S. Hawaii qualifies on both counts; however, DOE has
        consistently maintained that it is most economic to
        serve Hawaii from the central SPR on the Gulf Coasts
        of Texas and Louisiana or from the diversion of
        tankers at sea carrying Foreign or Alaskan North Slope
        (ANS) crude oil.
     
     .  Petroleum represents 90 percent of Hawaii's energy
        supply, especially transportation fuels.  The islands
        require large volumes of jet fuel for a healthy
        economy.  Endurance time in Hawaii is 30-50 days.
     
     .  Neither the Gulf Coast nor Alaska will provide energy
        security for Hawaii during the 1990s, and supplies
        from the Pacific Basin will become increasingly in
        tight supply.
     
     .  During the 1990s, the "developed world" is expected to
        become more heavily dependent on imported oil as ANS
        production begins a precipitous decline.  The "swing-
        producers" for imports into the U.S. will be in the
        MIddle East--especially Saudi Arabia.  U.S. import
        dependence is forecast to rise from 35 percent of
        total consumption in 1987 to more than 50 percent
        during the 1990s.
     
     .  By 1994, it is forecast that Hawaii will be totally
        dependent on imports for its crude oil supply.  The
        West Coast of the U.S. is expected to import plus or
        minus one-third of its oil in the late 1990s.

     .  The Pacific Basin imports half of its oil from the
        Middle East.  If there is a supply disruption-
        -especially one in the Persian Gulf--the Pacific Basin
        demand for available Australian and Southeast Asian
        crude oils will increase dramatically.
     
     .  Figures indicate that U.S. shipping requirements must
        be met by foreign tankers and the domestic tanker
        fleet is inadequate to meet disruption scenario
        demand.  There is also a deficiency in the number of
        small (below 80m dwt) tankers within the domestic U.S.
        Fleet.  Id. at v.

327. Id. at vii.

328. Id. at 83.

329. Id.

330. Hawaii, Department of Planning and Economic Development,
     Hawaii's Fuel Requirements for Essential Services
(Honolulu:
     Feb. 1983) at 59.

331. See notes 7 to 9 and accompanying text in chapter 3.

332. 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (state bounty for scrap automobiles may
     favor scrap processors with an in-state plant).

333. Id. at 810; see John E. Nowak, Ronald D. Rotunda, and J.
     Nelson Young, Constitutional Law, 3d ed. Hornbook Series
     (St. Paul, MN:  West Publishing Co., 1986) at 283; Laurence
     H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 2d ed. (Mineola, NY:
     The Foundation Press, 1988) at 430; Ralph C. Chandler, Richard A. Enslen, and Peter G. Renstrom, The
     Constitutional Law Dictionary (Santa Barbara, CA:  ABC-Clio, Inc., 1987)
     at 357 (vol. 2).

334. 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (state may limit the sale of cement
     produced at a state owned cement plant to state residents).

335. See Chandler, Enslen, and Renstrom (1987) at 357; Nowak,
     Rotunda, and Young (1986) at 283; and Tribe (1987) at 431.

336. Nowak, Rotunda, and Young (1986) at 283.

337. U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 3.

338. U.S. Const. art. VI.

339. Nowak, Rotunda, and Young (1986) at 260-261:
     
        The Constitution itself ... does not explicitly
        articulate the boundaries of this commerce power
        vested in Congress, particularly when Congress has not
        spoken.  Whether or not the commerce power is
        exclusive or to what extent concurrent state
        regulation may coexist in the absence of an
        articulated Congressional judgment is not textually
        demonstrable.  Moreover, the text of the commerce
        clause provides no overt restraint of state
        impingement of interstate commerce in the absence of
        Congressional legislation.  It has been left to the
        Court to interpret, as inherent in that affirmative
        grant of power, self-executing limitations on the
        scope of permissible state regulation.

340. Id. at 284 (footnote omitted).

341. Id.

342. Id.

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