308. Letter to researcher from Ted Gamble Clause, Deputy Attorney General, Department of the Attorney General, dated July 21, 1995, at 3, citing Hawaii, Department of the Attorney General, An Investigation of Gasoline Prices in Hawaii: A Preliminary Report (Honolulu: Sept. 1990) at 23 (hereinafter, "AG (1990)"). 309. Id. 310. Letter to researcher from Ted Gamble Clause, Deputy Attorney General, dated July 26, 1995, at 4; AG (1990) at 23. 311. Letter from John Tantlinger, Ed.D., Energy Planner for the Department of Business, Economic Development, and Tourism, to Wendell K. Kimura, Director, Legislative Reference Bureau, dated June 13, 1995, at 2-3. 312. Letter from John Tantlinger, Ed.D., Energy Planner for the Department of Business, Economic Development, and Tourism, to Wendell K. Kimura, Director, Legislative Reference Bureau, dated July 26, 1995, at 4. 313. Letter to researcher from Richard C. Botti, Executive Director of the Hawaii Automotive & Retail Gasoline Dealers Association, dated July 1, 1995, at 4. 314. Letter to researcher from Richard C. Botti, Executive Director of the Hawaii Automotive and Retail Gasoline Dealers Association, dated August 1, 1995, at 3. 315. Letter to researcher from Alec McBarnet, Jr., Vice President, Hawaii Petroleum Marketers Association, dated July 7, 1995, at 3. 316. Letter to researcher from Alec McBarnet, Jr., Vice President of the Hawaii Petroleum Marketers Association, August 14, 1995, at 2 (emphasis in original). 317. Letter to researcher from Jennifer A. Aquino, Administrative Manager, Aloha Petroleum, Ltd., September 21, 1995, at 4. 318. Id. at 8. 319. Letter to researcher from R. A. Broderick, Western Region Business Manager, Shell Oil Products Company, dated June 30,1995, at 5, citing Hawaii, Department of the Attorney General, The Attorney General's 1994 Interim Report on the *Investigation of Gasoline Prices (Honolulu: 1994) at 10 ("[T]he non-refiner incumbents could send gasoline to Hawaii.... But if they did, the additional gasoline they would supply to Hawaii, because of the inelastic demand for gasoline, would likely reduce the market price to the point of unprofitability...."). 320. Letter to researcher from R. A. Broderick, Western Region Business Manager, Shell Oil Products Company, dated July 31, 1995, at 4. 321. Letter to Wendell K. Kimura, Director, Legislative Reference Bureau, from Susan A. Kusunoki, Manager of State Governmental Activities, BHP Hawaii Inc., dated July 18, 1995, at 3-5. 322. Letter from Susan A. Kusunoki, BHP Hawaii Inc., to Wendell K. Kimura, Director, Legislative Reference Bureau, August 10, 1995, at 5-6. 323. Letter from J. W. McElroy, Regional Manager, Chevron U.S.A. Products Co., to Wendell K. Kimura, Director, Legislative Reference Bureau, dated August 7, 1995, at 4, 8. 324. Member countries of the International Energy Agency agreed to establish an emergency reserve of oil of ninety days of the previous year's imports by 1980; by 1985, the U.S. program sought to maintain reserves of at least one billion barrels. See Thomas C. Schelling, Thinking Through the Energy Problem (New York, NY: Committee for Economic Development, 1979) at 28. 325. Bruce W. Wilson, A Review of Factors Relating to the Establishment of a Regional Petroleum Reserve in Hawaii (Honolulu: Department of Business and Economic Development, Nov. 1988) at vii. 326. In particular, Wilson cited the following points in favor of the establishment of a regional petroleum reserve in the State: . A Regional Petroleum Reserve (RPR) should be sited in Hawaii to protect the economy of the State, to ensure the security of the citizens of the State, and to provide for the national defense. Relatively low oil prices would dictate that an RPR in Hawaii be sited and filled with volumes equal to 90 days of consumption as soon as possible. . RPRs were enacted under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) of 1975. Section 157(c) conferred discretionary authority on the Secretary of DOE to establish RPRs--in lieu of central SPR storage- -in insular or petroleum import-dependent areas of the U.S. Hawaii qualifies on both counts; however, DOE has consistently maintained that it is most economic to serve Hawaii from the central SPR on the Gulf Coasts of Texas and Louisiana or from the diversion of tankers at sea carrying Foreign or Alaskan North Slope (ANS) crude oil. . Petroleum represents 90 percent of Hawaii's energy supply, especially transportation fuels. The islands require large volumes of jet fuel for a healthy economy. Endurance time in Hawaii is 30-50 days. . Neither the Gulf Coast nor Alaska will provide energy security for Hawaii during the 1990s, and supplies from the Pacific Basin will become increasingly in tight supply. . During the 1990s, the "developed world" is expected to become more heavily dependent on imported oil as ANS production begins a precipitous decline. The "swing- producers" for imports into the U.S. will be in the MIddle East--especially Saudi Arabia. U.S. import dependence is forecast to rise from 35 percent of total consumption in 1987 to more than 50 percent during the 1990s. . By 1994, it is forecast that Hawaii will be totally dependent on imports for its crude oil supply. The West Coast of the U.S. is expected to import plus or minus one-third of its oil in the late 1990s. . The Pacific Basin imports half of its oil from the Middle East. If there is a supply disruption- -especially one in the Persian Gulf--the Pacific Basin demand for available Australian and Southeast Asian crude oils will increase dramatically. . Figures indicate that U.S. shipping requirements must be met by foreign tankers and the domestic tanker fleet is inadequate to meet disruption scenario demand. There is also a deficiency in the number of small (below 80m dwt) tankers within the domestic U.S. Fleet. Id. at v. 327. Id. at vii. 328. Id. at 83. 329. Id. 330. Hawaii, Department of Planning and Economic Development, Hawaii's Fuel Requirements for Essential Services (Honolulu: Feb. 1983) at 59. 331. See notes 7 to 9 and accompanying text in chapter 3. 332. 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (state bounty for scrap automobiles may favor scrap processors with an in-state plant). 333. Id. at 810; see John E. Nowak, Ronald D. Rotunda, and J. Nelson Young, Constitutional Law, 3d ed. Hornbook Series (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1986) at 283; Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 2d ed. (Mineola, NY: The Foundation Press, 1988) at 430; Ralph C. Chandler, Richard A. Enslen, and Peter G. Renstrom, The Constitutional Law Dictionary (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, Inc., 1987) at 357 (vol. 2). 334. 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (state may limit the sale of cement produced at a state owned cement plant to state residents). 335. See Chandler, Enslen, and Renstrom (1987) at 357; Nowak, Rotunda, and Young (1986) at 283; and Tribe (1987) at 431. 336. Nowak, Rotunda, and Young (1986) at 283. 337. U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 3. 338. U.S. Const. art. VI. 339. Nowak, Rotunda, and Young (1986) at 260-261: The Constitution itself ... does not explicitly articulate the boundaries of this commerce power vested in Congress, particularly when Congress has not spoken. Whether or not the commerce power is exclusive or to what extent concurrent state regulation may coexist in the absence of an articulated Congressional judgment is not textually demonstrable. Moreover, the text of the commerce clause provides no overt restraint of state impingement of interstate commerce in the absence of Congressional legislation. It has been left to the Court to interpret, as inherent in that affirmative grant of power, self-executing limitations on the scope of permissible state regulation. 340. Id. at 284 (footnote omitted). 341. Id. 342. Id.
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